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Preface 
This thesis was written as a part of the major Energy, Natural Resources and the Environment, 
within the Norwegian School of Economics’ Master’s Program in Economics and Business 
Administration. The subject of the thesis is Norwegian hydropower development, and the 
reason I chose this topic is that I consider it an important part of the history of Norway, and it 
is a continuously relevant topic in the media and politics, as recently displayed during the 
election campaign leading to this fall’s change in government.  
Before landing on researching the drivers and bottlenecks of the hydropower development, I 
contemplated several different research questions, which lead to the current structure of this 
thesis with a general focus on hydropower development and the specific goal of determining 
the factors prohibiting and motivating this development.  
I would like to thank the respondents from Småkraft, BKK, HelgelandsKraft, and Tafjord 
Kraftproduksjon, for being so welcoming and sharing, and not to mention quick to reply to 
follow-up questions. In addition, I would like to thank Robert Rønstad and the officials from 
NVE, for their quick and informative replies. Without the valuable information and knowledge 
of all of these people, I could not have completed this thesis. A special acknowledgment goes 
to my supervisor, Leif Kristoffer Sandal, for his advices and guidance throughout the entire 
process, and credit goes to the proofreaders for their hard work and excellent suggestions. The 
process of this Master’s Thesis has certainly been very educational, and it has been exciting 
to experience the Norwegian hydropower industry up close. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bergen, December 16 2013 
 
_________________________ 
Eivind Blankenberg Thomassen 
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Executive Summary 
The small hydropower industry in Norway is in a critical phase. The el-certificates system has 
proven to be a strong driver for new hydropower plants, as well as investments in existing 
plants, but with this system comes uncertainty regarding future revenue and profits. In addition 
to uncertainties connected to incentives, the price of electricity has fluctuated the past decade, 
fueling and dampening new investments with its movements. Strict acts and regulations 
concerning the utilization of rivers and lakes for electricity generation result in time-
consuming processes, for both developers and governmental caseworkers, culminating in long 
waiting lines for possible hydropower projects. With only nine years left for developers to 
make the el-certificates system, actors in the industry expect a large increase in new electricity 
generation through new hydropower plants, which can affect both access to materials and the 
electricity price. In this thesis I have looked at the difficulties the hydropower industry have 
faced, are facing, and is likely to face in the future, through interviews with developers, and 
by looking at the industry in a historical perspective. Opinions surrounding the strength of the 
hydropower industry seem to differ, and there is great uncertainty concerning the future.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this chapter, I will describe the background and motivation for my choice of topic in my 
Master’s Thesis, and I intend to talk about what made me decide on this specific topic. Further, 
I will present my research question, as well as the data I am basing my research on, and in the 
last part, I explain the structure of my thesis. 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Water is a vital part of human existence. It covers about 70.9% of the earth’s surface, while 
about 60% of the human body consist of water. The chemical compound, composed of two 
hydrogen molecules and one oxygen molecule, hence its chemical formula H2O, also plays an 
important role in the photosynthesis, creating oxygen as a waste product. Aside from its 
organic and chemical properties, water is also a great source of power – especially in its 
moving form – that we are able to harness to generate electricity. Merriam-Webster defines 
hydroelectricity as “the production of electricity by using machines that are powered by 
moving water” (Merriam-Webster, 2013a). Another term for this is hydroelectric power, or 
the shortened hydropower, which I will refer to in my thesis.  
With its mountainous topography and generally wet climate, Norway has long been utilizing 
one of its natural benefits – hydropower. Twenty percent of the country rise more than 900 
meters above sea level, effectively rendering a large part of the country uninhabitable and 
unsuitable for income-related activities such as farming (Vogt, 1971). However, in these high 
mountains, lakes form because of local rainfall and melting snow, lakes that are ideal for 
storing and generating large amounts of power. With some intervening, we are able to store 
more of this untapped power by creating dams that, due to a somewhat predictable 
precipitation, rarely empties out. The water that does not gather in such reservoirs will 
continue to flow downwards in watercourses, defined as natural or artificial channels through 
which water flows (Merriam-Webster, 2013b), allowing for power generation further down 
the mountains as well. 
There is an ever-increasing global focus on the environment, and organizations devoted to 
spread awareness of our fragile earth has blossomed since the late 1980s. The concern about 
the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has led to international agreements, in the hopes 
of reducing the collective pollution. Most notable is the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, governed by 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in which 191 
parties commits to reducing their respective emissions (UNFCCC, 2013a). On September 27 
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2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), one of the recipients of the 
2007 Nobel Peace Prize, released a short and bold statement in connection with the publication 
of their 2013 report on climate change. This report stated that it is extremely likely that humans 
are the dominant cause for climate change and global warming (IPCC, 2013). Industrialized 
countries now have the watchful eyes of other countries, intergovernmental organizations, and 
concerned citizens carefully studying their environmental moves. Thus, many countries are 
looking towards renewable energy sources to reduce their emissions while maintaining a 
similar level of energy consumption. Governments are introducing incentives to encourage the 
use of renewable energy, like the el-certificates in Norway in 2012, which is a collective effort 
with Sweden to increase the clean power supply by financially rewarding developers of 
renewable energy sources.  
With the increased focus on renewable energy, researchers, engineers, and economists are 
trying to figure out the best possible energy solutions for the future. It is important to remember 
that although the desired goal is an energy source that is renewable, and by extension 
unlimited, we are still talking about a resource, which means that some countries have a 
greater advantage when it comes to tapping into and utilizing these energy sources. The 
attention seems to be directed towards relatively new ways of harnessing renewable energy, 
like wind and solar power, while it appears to be less focus on more traditional solutions, like 
hydropower. A quick search on Google Trends1 shows that although slowly decreasing in 
global popularity since 2008, “solar power” is still the most searched term out of the four I 
included, and “water power” just passed “wind power” in 2011. On average, “water power” is 
still the less searched term; see Illustration 1 in Appendix A. 
1.2 Research Question 
Norway is the sixth largest generator of hydropower in the world (Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 2013a), and The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) 
estimates that there are currently 214 TWh of annual hydropower generation potential in 
Norway, of which 40% – about 85.6 TWh – is untapped (NVE, 2013). This indicates that 
Norway not only has great experience and knowledge when it comes to hydropower, but also 
that there are still expansion possibilities in the hydropower industry. 
                                                 
1 Google Trends uses global search terms, by giving them reference points relative to the number of searches on Google 
within the given period. It is not an exact science, as language and spelling will differ worldwide, but it gives us an indication 
of the trends. 
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So with this great hydropower potential, why is it that Norwegian companies choose to invest 
in other renewable energy projects abroad, like Statoil and Statkraft’s ten billion-kroner 
investment in the Sheringham Shoal offshore wind farm off the east coast of England (Scira 
Offshore Energy, 2009)? Are there signs of fundamentally flawed mechanisms in the market 
for hydropower development that make large investments undesirable? 
Former Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, said in his annual New Year’s speech in 
2001, “We have now come to the point where further developments of large hydropower plants 
are over” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). As it is NVE and the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy who makes the final decision concerning close to all hydropower license 
applications (NVE, 2009a), the Prime Minister’s statement indirectly introduced smaller 
hydropower plants as more viable options for the future of hydropower generation. This 
statement also forms the basis of my research, as I intend to focus on small-scale hydropower, 
i.e. power plants with an installed effect of 1.0 to 10 megawatts (MW). We usually refer to 
hydropower plants this size as small hydropower plants, or shortened, small hydros. 
I want to look at the development of such small hydros, and try to determine whether there are 
any reasons why it seems that there is a lack of interest in hydropower in Norway. Is it possible 
to connect such possible reasons to endogenous and exogenous variables that are instrumental 
in hydropower generation, like electricity prices, financial incentives, new inventions, politics, 
and public opinion?  
My research question is therefore as follows: 
What are the drivers and bottlenecks of the small hydropower industry, 
and how will these further affect the development? 
1.3 Data and Information 
I have based my thesis on three different kinds of data. First, I have collected data from 
Statistics Norway, as well as received data and information from officials at NVE and a 
hydropower project developer. Second, I have studied the history of the Norwegian 
hydropower from the late 19th century until now, and used this information to support the 
aforementioned data and subsequent research results. Third, and most important, I have 
conducted four interviews – two personal, one video conference, and one interview via e-mail 
– with companies that develop hydropower plants, whose opinions and thoughts I will 
compare and analyze to form conclusions and answer my research question. 
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1.4 Structure 
In this section, I will describe how I have decided to structure my thesis to achieve the most 
natural and reasonable approach to this subject. The next chapter will serve three purposes. 
First, it will shortly describe how hydropower plants work, to equip the reader with a basic 
understanding of the term hydropower. Second, it will provide a thorough report of the most 
important events in modern hydropower history. The third part will center on the development 
of hydropower plants thus far, and I am going to present the application process that 
developers must go through, and look into how this has changed over the years.  
In Chapter 3, I will elaborate on the choices I have made when it comes to collection of data 
and information, how I conducted my interviews and analysis, and how the methods I have 
used may affect my results and conclusion.  
Further, in Chapter 4, I am describing the costs normally connected to a small hydropower 
plant, in part by reviewing an actual investment analysis, after which I will look at the 
electricity in Norway in Chapter 5. Here I will present relevant data and information on 
electricity prices, generation, distribution, and consumption, in addition to thoroughly 
describing the el-certificates system. Chapter 6 will contain a short presentation of each of the 
companies I have interviewed, to provide the reader with a quick overview of their general 
motives and focus.  
I present the results of my interviews in Chapter 7, and in this chapter, I will analyze the 
information gathered concerning the interviewees’ thoughts and opinions on the factors 
surrounding the previous, present, and future hydropower development. I discuss the 
collective results in Chapter 8, in which I compare these to the theory and secondary data 
previously described in this thesis, and this discussion will serve as a platform for my 
conclusions following in Chapter 9, together with possible topics for further research and 
studies. After the list of references, I have included an appendix consisting of information that 
the reader might find useful, like the interview guide I used in my thesis and additional graphs. 
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Chapter 2: An Introduction to Hydropower 
This chapter will serve as the technological and historical background of my thesis, with a 
brief walkthrough of how hydropower plants work. As this thesis is within the field of 
economics, I will not go too deep into the technical specifications, but rather explain it in a 
manner that is sufficient for my further analyses. Thereafter I will present the reader with 
accounts of what I consider the most important – and relevant – events in modern Norwegian 
hydropower history. In the second half of this chapter, I will present data on the development, 
and a description of the license application process.  
2.1 The Specifications of a Hydropower Plant 
Hydropower is the art of utilizing the energy that is stored in water, which, like all things, 
contain two types of energy. We know the energy stored in motionless objects – like still water 
– as potential energy. In moving water, however, this energy transforms into kinetic energy, a 
power created by the force of the gravitational pull on the water. Thus, the higher the drop of 
a watercourse, and the wider it is, the more energy the water releases. As we will see, we have 
known how to somewhat capture this power for a long time, but it is with electricity generation 
it gets interesting.  
2.1.1 The Two Types of Hydropower Plants 
To harness the energy of moving water, developers can build hydropower plants that capture 
this energy directly from the watercourse, or they can dam a watercourse, creating a reservoir 
of potential energy that the operator can use to the control flow of water to the power plant. 
The latter involves a steadier electricity generation throughout the year, but also more 
interference in the environment, and power companies typically use this solution in larger 
hydropower projects. Small hydros often establish somewhat of a reservoir as well, but to a 
much lesser extent that what we talk about with large hydros, and more as a protective means 
rather than for storing water and control input. I will refer to these small hydro reservoirs as 
pools further in my thesis. In any case, the basics of hydropower is the controlled flow of 
water, centered towards a turbine, which creates a rotating movement that transfers to a 
connected generator. This process transforms the kinetic energy into mechanical energy, and 
the generator uses this new energy to produce electricity by rotating a copper thread in a circle 
of magnets (Spilsbury, 2012).  
As water carries organisms, debris, and especially ice in the winter, it is important that 
developers filter the incoming water somehow, to shield and protect the turbine. This filtration 
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starts with the intake, which is comprised of a grating and a hatch. In large hydros, we find 
these components somewhere in the conduit, i.e. the pipeline that transfers water from the 
reservoir to the turbine in the power station, usually placed close to the water source. In small 
hydros, we normally see the intake built into the pool construction. By doing so, small hydros 
can control for river sediments and debris – which will sink to the bottom of the pool or stop 
at the grating – and as icing in the winter, as well as the velocity of the incoming water. By 
protecting the hydropower plant from such externalities, one can reduce the wear and tear on 
the equipment, especially the turbine (NVE, 2010a). 
2.1.2 The Effect of the Turbine and Resource Rent Tax 
We consider the turbine one of the most important parts of a hydropower plant, and without 
it, we could not generate electricity. There are several different kinds of turbines to choose 
from, mostly depending on the water’s drop height, but also on the amount of water input. The 
most common turbine in Norwegian hydropower is the Francis turbine, which is ideal for 
medium and large drop heights, from 30 to 600 meters. The Pelton turbine is more suitable if 
you have a higher drop height and relatively low water inflow, while some consider the Kaplan 
turbine best for watercourse hydropower, as this is more effective with lower drop heights and 
higher water inflow (Brødrene Dahl, 2013); see Illustration 2 in Appendix A. The effect of a 
power plant’s installed turbines determines the classification of the power plant, and thereby 
the bureaucratic process the developers must go through during the planning stage. Within 
small-scale hydropower, we find the already mentioned small hydro, with a turbine effect of 
1.0 to 10 MW. A power plant with an installed effect of 0.1 to 1.0 MW we consider a mini 
hydropower plant, and we denote a power plant with a lower effect than 0.1 MW a micro 
hydropower plant. The effect of the turbines also decides the tax level of a hydropower plant. 
As with most natural resources, the government subjects companies or private citizens 
operating a hydropower plant with a certain installed effect to a tax on resource rent, which is 
the government’s way to secure an income from the exploitation of these resources. In 
Norway, the resource rent tax on hydropower is now 30% (Ministry of Finance, 2009), and in 
comparison, the resource rent tax on petroleum is 50% (Hannesson, 1998, p. 116). Today, the 
government enforces this tax on hydropower plants with an installed effect of 5.5 megavolt-
ampere (MVA), which is just below 5.5 MW (Lie, 2012a). This means that small hydro with 
an installed effect of 5.5 MW or higher must pay an additional tax of 30% on the total amount 
of generated electricity, in addition to the regular corporate or private income tax, which are 
both currently 28%, making the marginal tax rate 58%. Both hydropower companies and 
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environmentalists have strong opinions on this resource rent tax; developers want to increase 
the 5.5 MW level, while environmentalists are campaigning to subject all hydropower plants, 
no matter the size, to the tax (Lie, 2012a). The Conservative Party and the Progress Party, the 
two political parties who this fall formed Norway’s new government, have both been in favor 
of increasing this maximum effect level. In their Political Platform, a document with their 
major political commitments presented on October 7 2013, the governing parties included 
their ambition of increasing the resource rent tax level to 10 MW, effectively exempting all 
small hydros from the resource rent tax (Office of the Prime Minister, 2013, p. 63). However, 
when the new government presented their revised state budget for 2014 on November 8 2013, 
it was clear that the exemption of small hydros from the resource rent tax would not happen 
just yet and instead the hydropower and petroleum industries must expect an increase in the 
resource rent tax to 31% and 51%, respectively. Combined with a proposed reduction from 
28% to 27% in both corporate and private income tax, the marginal corporate income tax for 
the hydropower industry will still be 58% (Department of Finance, 2013). 
2.1.3 Electricity Generation 
We measure the electricity generated in a hydropower plant in kilowatts per hour, kWh, which 
is the amount of energy generated in an hour if the effect is 1.0 kW (SNL, 2010), and in most 
cases with small hydro, the easiest denotation is gigawatts per hour, GWh (1 000 000 kWh). 
The amount of electricity that a hydropower plant transports to the electricity suppliers 
depends on several factors in the mechanics of the plant. The effect of the turbines is of course 
very important, but one must also take other parts of the generation process into account. If 
there are locations in the system where some kinetic energy is lost, for example in the conduit, 
the turbine will not run optimally, reducing the total amount of GWh. Because of different 
generation due to warm summers and cold winters, we use the annual average generation2as 
a measure for hydropower plants, both individually and collectively.  
The power grid, i.e. a network of electrical wires and equipment that supplies electricity to 
large areas (Merriam-Webster, 2013c), immediately transports the generated electricity via 
the network operator, who is in charge of the main power grids, to the local grid companies 
that distributes it to the consumers through the power suppliers (Statnett, 2013). In the Nordic 
                                                 
2 One usually estimates electricity generation in hydropower for both summer and winter, and these two measures form the 
annual average generation.  
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and Baltic countries, the electricity price is market based, settled on the Nord Pool power 
exchange every day, which I will further explain in Chapter 5. The power grid is a natural 
monopoly, in that it is not cost-efficient for more than one company to operate it. 
Governmental-owned Statnett is the operator of the main power grid in Norway, while there 
are about 156 local grid companies (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2012a), and due to 
their natural monopoly activities, the government imposes regulations concerning open access 
and equal treatment for all electricity generators, to ensure the maintained power balance. The 
Competition Authority and NVE monitor the relationships between the power producers, 
Statnett, the local grid companies, and the power suppliers, making sure the market actors 
follow the Competition Law of 2004 (Bergman et al, 2000, p. 126).  
The grid companies and Statnett are depending on a source of income that they obtain through 
a network tariff, which both electricity consumers and generators must pay to gain access to 
the electricity in the power grid. This network tariff is comprised of two elements, a variable 
part and a fixed part. The variable tariff goes to covering costs of electricity transporting and 
the unavoidable loss of electricity during this transportation, which varies, and will therefore 
depend on electricity consumption and generation. The fixed part goes to maintenance and 
expansion of the power grid (NVE, 2013a). The grid companies set the network tariff under 
strict regulation under NVE, who sets a maximum tariff based on individual historical costs.  
2.2 An Overview of Historical Hydropower Generation in Norway 
To be able to look at the current and future development of hydropower in Norway, I believe 
it is important to understand how this market has evolved, and determine the historical 
problems and opportunities that have slowed down and fueled the hydropower market, 
respectively. Norway saw the blossoming of the “modern” hydropower a little more than a 
hundred years ago, and in this section, I will describe the most important events in hydropower 
history. 
2.2.1 An Early Beginning 
In Norway, people have been utilizing waterpower since the early Middle Ages, in its most 
primitive form. Back then, around the year 1200, mills and farms used this to create 
mechanical power. These watermills were quite simple, with an installed wooden water wheel 
that utilized flowing water to create movements in machinery that made farming easier. The 
popularity of such mills grew, and by the middle of the 18th century watermills had become 
an important part of the society, with water supplying mechanical power not only to farms and 
sawmills, but to important industries like ironworks and mines. During the 19th century, a 
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water wheel made of steel replaced the simple, wooden wheel, resulting in a higher efficiency 
(SNL, 2013a). In Great Britain, the watermills played an important part as a supporting means 
of power during the Industrial Revolution, ca. 1750 to 1870, when coal, as fuel for the steam 
engine, was not always easy to come across. Senjens Nikkelverk, a nickel works on the island 
of Senja, in Northern Norway, built in 1882 is said to be one of the first hydropower plants in 
both Norway and Europe (Thue, 2006). The capacity of the plant was 6.5 kW, which today 
would classify as one-fifteenth of a micro hydro.  
The late 19th century saw the introduction of electricity in Norway, and with the development 
of electric power transmission, owners of hydropower plants saw a possibility to harness the 
superfluous energy generated and transport this to factories and plants farther away. The first 
example of this in Norway was the wood processing factory Laugstol Brug in Skien. The 
operations manager of the factory, engineer Gunnar Knudsen, realized that they simply 
produced too much electricity, and started to sell the surplus of electricity to other Skien-based 
factories. Laugstol Brug based their dynamos and incandescent light bulbs on foreign 
inventions. 
The generated energy was no longer just a mode of mechanical power to the factories in close 
vicinity to the water source, and the factories could make profits from selling the produced 
electricity. Thus, a heated political debate began, raising the questions: who were the real 
owners of the flowing rivers, who were allowed to invest in these hydropower plants, and how 
was the produced electricity going to be distributed? 
2.2.2 An Electric Era 
As the 20th century approached, a new industry blossomed: The power plants separated from 
the factories, leading to the founding of the central power plants. These plants generated 
electricity solely for selling it, modeled after Thomas A. Edison’s Pearl Street Station in New 
York, opened in 1882. In Hammerfest, one of the first Norwegian central power plants opened 
in 1891. This was a hydropower plant, which transmitted electricity as much as 1.2 km away 
through alternating current (AC). One year later, Kristiania (now Oslo) saw its first central 
power plant, which ran on steam power through direct current (DC). The emergence of these 
quite differently powered plants sparked the debate between Norwegian engineers on what the 
“Norwegian Model” should be like. Engineers felt a modern solution was to focus on 
hydropower with alternating current dynamos, and this soon became a standard. 
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Central power plants were built in about twenty Norwegian cities up until 1900, with the focus 
being on supplying power to streetlights and public offices. Municipalities owned about half 
of these plants, while private companies accounted for the other half. Though the generation 
of electricity appeared to be expanding rapidly, it would take another 60 years for the majority 
of the Norwegian population to have electricity installed in their homes. 
2.2.3 The Early Governmental Acts 
Already in 1887 came the first act regulating the watercourses and in 1891, the government 
introduced the first act concerning electrical installations and plants, with an extension added 
in 1896. The common denominator for these acts was that they were considered to 
underestimate the value of Norwegian hydropower, especially because their focus was on 
hydropower as a driver for the more traditional mechanical power, with the turbines directly 
connected to the machinery. This means that the acts did not take into account the growing 
central power plants industry, which many criticized. One of the critics was Gunnar Knudsen, 
engineer and former operations manager at Laugstol Brug. Knudsen was in 1892 a member of 
the Norwegian Parliament, and he spoke out against what he believed was a grave error in 
valuation of the hydropower. At the same time, he warned the government about foreign 
investors, who had recently begun to show an interest in Norwegian watercourses. Knudsen 
feared this would lead to speculative investments and higher prices for the industries, and 
urged the government to buy rights to watercourses to prevent this. Another of Knudsen’s 
justifications for governmental purchases of such rights was to prepare for the electrification 
of the railroads. The debate ended with some governmental investments, limited to the supply 
of electricity to railroads, as the government did not seem to consider foreign investors the 
threat as Knudsen would have them to be. After this, the debates surrounding the Norwegian 
hydropower subsided and it would take about another decade for them to become a prominent 
part of political debates again, with an outcome that would change the course of the Norwegian 
hydropower drastically.  
2.2.4 The Modern Hydropower Politics 
The beginning of the 20th century was a period of relatively large political changes in Norway. 
Most prominent was the dissolution of the Union between Norway and Sweden in 1905, 
leaving Norway as an independent country for the first time since 1319 (SNL, 2013b). 
Christian Michelsen, Prime Minister of Norway during the last year of the Union with Sweden, 
played an important role in the dissolution of the Union, and was elected Prime Minister when 
Norway became independent (SNL, 2013c). Michelsen was at the time the leader of the 
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Liberal Party, and thus began a period of fifteen years with mostly liberal Prime Ministers 
(SNL, 2013d), which would have a significant impact on the hydropower industry.  
In 1906, the government realized that Member of Parliament and hydropower advocate 
Gunnar Knudsen might have been right in his warnings about foreign investors a decade 
earlier. It was Norwegian engineers educated abroad who early on saw the potential in 
Norwegian hydropower, and with the help of foreign investors, they started to buy 
watercourses to develop industries. Knud Bryn bought the rights to the waterfall Sarpsfossen 
with the help of German investors, and in 1899, his newly founded company Hafslund began 
production of calcium carbide (Hafslund, 2013). Engineer Sam Eyde also spearheaded several 
investments in Norwegian watercourses to ensure electricity supply for his planned chemical 
industries, with the help of a prominent Swedish banking clan, the Wallenberg family. Eyde 
founded, among other, Elkem and Norsk Hydro, in 1904 and 1905, respectively. 
Although the foreign investments in Norwegian hydropower resulted in large industries, 
securing jobs, and fueled what is called the Second Industrial Revolution (SNL, 2013e), the 
government decided to revise the existing watercourses laws, fearing for the future of 
Norwegian hydropower ownership. The revisions in 1906 were made in such a hurry that the 
result became known as the Panic Acts – undoubtedly one of the more dramatic nicknames in 
Norwegian legislative history. The Panic Acts’ most important clause was that foreign 
investors needed permission – license – from the King of Norway to buy rights to watercourse 
properties (Thue, 2003). Although the acts were somewhat rushed, the idea of licensing when 
it came to watercourses and hydropower stands as a cornerstone in Norwegian hydropower 
politics, and the acts represented the first step for the government as an active regulator, 
developer, and in some cases, generator of Norwegian hydropower.  
2.2.5 Gunnar Knudsen and the Common Good 
There was an increased focus on hydropower from the dissolution of the Union until the early 
1920s. Due to the relatively stable economy in this period, the development of hydropower 
plants increased, and these supplied the electricity needed for the new chemical industries that 
represented the Second Industrial Revolution. Another major influence on the development of 
Norwegian hydropower in this period was the liberal Prime Minister elected in 1908 – none 
other than hydropower pioneer Gunnar Knudsen. Knudsen served two periods as Prime 
Minister in this period, from 1908 to 1910, and again from 1913 to 1920, making him the sixth 
longest-sitting Prime Minister in Norwegian history (NBL, 2009). Another influential 
politician in Knudsen’s first period was Minister of Justice, Johan Castberg. Castberg engaged 
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in, among others, the rights to watercourses, and was an avid Henry George follower. This 
ideology focused on property rights of natural resources and discouraged private owners and 
speculators. Henry George had argued that the values of the natural properties is an effect of 
the development in the Norwegian society, and therefore the hydropower should serve the 
common good. Knudsen supported this idea, and he believed this could best function if the 
hydropower profits were issued differently. This lead to a shift in the distribution of 
hydropower, from governmental to municipal, and two important acts, introduced in 1917, 
greatly represented this shift of power. 
2.2.6 New Acts and Hydropower Municipalism  
Like the Panic Acts of 1906, the two new acts characterized important steps towards the 
hydropower regulations we know today. The introduced acts were the Industrial Licensing Act 
– later replaced by the Acquisition Act – and the Watercourse Regulation Act (NVE, 2009b). 
These acts prioritized the public good above the major industries when it came acquisitions, 
development, and regulation of watercourses, and a key term was reversion. According to both 
the Industrial Licensing Act and the Watercourse Regulation Act, the watercourses and its 
adjoining power plants would automatically revert to the government after a licensing period 
of 60 years. A part of the value of these power plants – one third or less – would go to the 
municipalities. However, the Watercourse Regulation Act stipulated that so-called power 
municipalities, i.e. municipalities with vast power resources, would be exempted from this 
reversion rule if the generated power served the common good. 
2.2.7 Electricity Optimism and the Economic Stagnation of the 1920s 
Into the 1920s, the Norwegian economy was still relatively stable, and the government 
appointed in 1919 an Electricity Commission, headed by engineer in hydropower and 
professor at the Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH) Olav Heggstad. Heggstad and his 
team of engineers started to work on a national-scale plan for further developing the electricity 
supply, which the Commission presented in 1922. Several Norwegian counties and 
municipalities proceeded to follow this plan, which led to large investments in hydropower 
over the next few years.  
However, the period between the World Wars would soon prove to cause financial distress 
also in Norway, and the investments made as a part of the national electricity plan were put 
on hold – indefinitely. The demand for electricity dived, as large industries had to shut down 
production due to low exports. Several factories, such as Norsk Aluminium Company in 
Høyanger, had to sell shares to acquire capital to stay afloat. In many cases, foreign investors 
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came to the rescue, and it became an increasing trend with partial foreign ownership in 
Norwegian industries in this period. Another consequence of the decline in electricity demand 
was that the hydropower plants built during the “power boom” a decade earlier were now 
generating at a loss, and the government came close to selling some of the hydropower plants 
in its portfolio.  
2.2.8 Increased Demand in the 1930s and Post-War Growth 
Despite the pessimism that grew in the Norwegian power industry during the late 1920s, the 
development of hydropower plants did not come to a complete stop. By the early 1930s, the 
demand for electricity began to rise again, mainly due to increased demand for aluminum and 
alloys. In the mid- to late 1930s the Nazi air force – the Luftwaffe – and its commander-in-
chief Hermann Göring showed a particular interest in the Norwegian light metals. A couple of 
years later, this interest led to the second full-scale national plan for the Norwegian power 
industry, during the German Occupation of Norway, from 1940 to 1945. Ultimately, the new 
national plan ended when the Occupation did. 
Although the Second World War caused a lot of destruction on Continental Europe, as well in 
certain parts of Norway, Norwegian hydropower plants and electricity supply were largely 
unaffected. On the contrary, the German Occupation’s national power supply plan resulted in 
the development of several hydropower plants. The hydropower plants Tyin in Årdal (in 
production in 1944) (SNL, 2013f) and Mår in Tinn (development started in 1942) (SNL, 
2013g) are examples of plants that the German forces worked on, and the latter is still 
generating electricity today. 
After the war, the debate about whom the power generation should benefit reignited. Engineer 
and former principal of NTH, Fredrik Vogt, spoke against the Industrial Licensing Act, and 
wanted the government to open up for energy-intensive industries.  In 1947, then-ruling Labor 
Party appointed Vogt director-general of the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Department (NVE) which led to massive expansions in the hydropower generating industry. 
Mår hydropower plant was finished, and NVE started development on other large-scale 
hydropower plants, supplying factories like Norsk Hydro and Årdal Verk. After several years 
in a state of arrested development due to the war, NVE was officially back on track as the 
government’s “hand” in hydropower production and supply. 
In this period, the number of municipal hydropower projects was also increasing, but as the 
government, through NVE, was supplying most of the energy-intensive industry – as well as 
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the wood processing industry – with cheap electricity, the private development of hydropower 
plants came to a halt. Due to the many new hydropower plants built up until the early 1960s, 
the government expanded the power grid, binding the country’s power supply together. 
Especially important at the time was the connection between the east and west. 
2.2.9 A Change in Popular Opinion and the Alta Watercourse Controversy 
The expansion of the hydropower industry from the late 1940s led to several large hydropower 
plants. Some of these involved major environmental interference, and in the mid-1960s 
protests and demonstrations rose against such large hydropower constructions, which many 
perceived as destructive. Initially, youth and students from the affected areas led the 
demonstrations, but the rest of the communities soon joined in the fight against developers. 
The demonstrations reached a peak in 1968, when NVE presented its plans for the watercourse 
running through Alta and Kautokeino in Northern Norway, simply referred to as the Alta 
River.  
The initial plans for a hydropower plant in the Alta River caused a massive uproar in the 
Norwegian society, and they engaged municipalities, environmental organizations, private 
citizens, and especially the physically affected indigenous Sami people. The plans included 
damming the lake Virdnejávri to serve as a reservoir for the plant, which originally meant 
submerging the village of Máze, predominantly inhabited by Sami people (SNL, 2013h). In 
1973, NVE altered the design of the reservoir to accommodate the newly approved 
governmental protection of Máze. In 1978, the Norwegian Parliament approved the Alta 
hydropower plant and its installations, and the same year protestors formed the organization 
People’s Action Against the Alta/Kautokeino Watercourse Development. In the summer of 
1979, the organization started one of the biggest cases of civil disobedience in Norwegian 
history, demanding that NVE stop the construction of the hydropower plant. Despite 
successfully delaying construction through hunger strikes, large demonstrations, and claims 
of destruction of heritage sites, the Supreme Court ruled the construction of the Alta 
hydropower plant legal in 1982, which led to the dissolution of the People’s Action shortly 
after (SNL, 2009). Because of the massive attention that surrounded the construction, as well 
as the cultural impact the protests had on both Norwegians and the Sami people, the Alta 
power plant is today listed as one of Norway’s cultural heritage plants, a list compiled by NVE, 
Energi Norge, Statkraft, Norsk Hydro, and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage (SNL, 2013i). 
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2.2.10 The Era of Protection 
On April 6 1973, while the protests against the Alta power plant were in full swing, the 
Norwegian Parliament approved the first Protection Plan for Watercourses, after decades of 
discussion and planning (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 1994). The first plan included a 
permanent protection of 95 watercourses, and the goal of the plan was to secure values 
connected to natural sciences, cultural heritage, scenery and outdoor recreation. The 
Parliament approved Protection Plan number two, three, and four in 1980, 1986, and 1993, 
respectively. In addition, the Parliament added two supplements, the first in 2005, and the 
second in 2009, after which it considered the Protection Plan completed. As of now, the 
protection list includes 388 watercourses, representing an estimated 49.5 TWh of production 
(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013b). These 49.5 TWh are included in the estimates of 
potential annual hydropower generation mentioned in Chapter 1.2, which means that about 
23% of the total 214 TWh are in fact inaccessible by law. Thus, a remaining 36.1 TWh of 
annual Norwegian hydropower generation is still untapped and “available”. In the 2005 
supplement, the Parliament also decided to exempt hydropower plants with an installed effect 
of 1.0 MW or less from the protection plans, meaning that NVE can approve mini hydropower 
projects’ license applications, despite being located in a protected watercourse. 
2.2.11 Collaborations 
Until the 1960s, it was often single investors, municipalities, or government-controlled 
companies like NVE who planned and built hydropower plants. As larger hydropower plants 
became more sought after, joint ventures between companies emerged as a trend that would 
continue into the 21st century. An early example of this was the hydropower company Sira-
Kvina, formed in 1963 as a collaboration between Lyse Produksjon, Statkraft, Skagerak Kraft, 
and Agder Energi Produksjon (SNL, 2013j). Statkraft is fully governmental-owned, while the 
other three companies have both governmental and municipal shareholders. The collaboration 
involved a massive project in the Sira and Kvina watercourses, which would eventually serve 
seven hydropower plants. Construction of the first of six steps was completed in 1968, and the 
entire project was finished in 1989 (Sira-Kvina Kraftselskap, 2013). 
2.2.12 Liberalization of the Electricity Market – The Energy Act 
In 1990, the government presented the Energy Act, which involved major changes in the 
Norwegian power market. According to Thue (2006), the figureheads of the Energy Act were 
Prime Minister Jan P. Syse, Minister of Petroleum and Energy Eivind Reiten, as well as the 
Centre for Applied Research at the Norwegian School of Economics. The act opened for 
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competition in generation and supply, as well as trading with electricity, and for the consumers 
one of the biggest changes involved the right to choose which company they wanted to serve 
as their electricity supplier, effectively liberalizing the power market. In 1992, as a part of this 
liberalization, the government separated then-Statkraft into two entities, Statkraft and Statnett, 
responsible for electricity generation and the power grid, respectively. This is comparable to 
the liberalization of the gas market in the United Kingdom, where British Gas, controlling the 
gas pipeline – also a natural monopoly, had to separate its services into several companies to 
comply with the requirement of third party access. This means that a company controlling a 
natural monopoly must allow any company access to the monopolized resource, whether it is 
a gas pipeline or power grid, for a reasonable tariff (Hannesson, 1998). 
Opponents of the act raised concerns about the effectiveness of the market powers in a liberal 
electricity market. Lawyer Ingolf Vislie spoke in late 1990 about the possible effect the 
existing percentage tax would have on power companies in a decentralized market (Vislie, 
1990, cited in Thue, 2003, p. 173). According to Vislie, if the power companies do not have 
the possibility to adjust the electricity prices, as a free market solution entails, they cannot 
ensure that their income is sufficient to pay their taxes, which the Norwegian tax authorities 
mainly based on the value of the power plant. The Ministry of Finance agreed with Vislie, but 
it would still take six years for the introduction of a different tax system for power companies, 
based on revenue (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, 1997). Even 
though the debate grew quite heated in certain circles, the act appeared to go almost unnoticed 
in the public. Thue (2006) accredits some of this public indifference to the generally low 
electricity prices in the first half of the 1990s, due to increased temperature, and heavy 
precipitation, which led to a decrease in demand for electricity, and full reservoirs, 
respectively.  
The Parliament adopted the Energy Act on January 1 1991. The following years saw a 
stagnation in the development of hydropower plants, according to Thue (2006). Though he 
does not go into details surrounding this decline, it is possible that the current financial crisis 
in the Nordic countries (Ministry of Finance, 2011), perhaps combined with the current tax 
issues, held some responsibility. The completion of the Svartisen hydropower plant in 1993 
(SNL, 2013k) stood solitary as one of the few large hydropower plants completed in the 1990s 
(Thue, 2006).  
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2.3 Data Analysis of the Hydropower Development  
In this part, I will present the first part of the data I have collected from Statistics Norway, 
shortened SSB. Founded in 1876, Statistics Norway has long been in charge of the official 
statistics in Norway, governed by the Ministry of Finance (SSB, 2013a). Statistics Norway 
gathers information and data on different subjects, like society, industries, and economics, and 
has a vast statistical database. In this thesis, I will look at data sets collected from Statistics 
Norway, and perform simple analyses to further use as support for my research and findings. 
Concerning the development of hydropower I have collected two data sets, one based on the 
accumulative number of hydropower plants from 1970 to 2012, and one describing the amount 
of new hydropower plants on an annual basis from 1900 to 2012.  
2.3.1 New Hydropower Plants 1900-2012 
The data I consider relevant in this chapter is the number of new hydropower plants from year 
to year. First, I will present the data on the number of new hydropower plants from 1900 to 
2012, as registered by NVE3, provided by Haakon Skau Seming, Senior Engineer at NVE. 
Graph 1 below illustrates the data: 
 
Graph 1. Source: NVE via. Seming, H. S. (2013). Small Hydro ≤ 10 MW, Large Hydro > 10 MW. 
                                                 
3 Based on the reporting system that NVE imposes on developers (NVE, 2009a) 
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I have sorted the data according to the sizes most appropriate for my thesis, Small and Large. 
From the graph, we can see that the number of new hydropower plants have varied somewhat 
over the years. Especially the period from 1950 to 1990 we can characterize as a period of 
volatility, with few clear trends. After mid-1990, however, Large Hydro seems to permanently 
decline, while Small Hydro has quite a dramatic increase, and subsequent decrease after 2007. 
It is worth mentioning that power plants with an installed effect of less than 1.0 MW represent 
close to half of the total Small Hydro data collected. On average, developers built 9.58 small 
hydropower plants annually in Norway from 1900 to 2012. Some sources incorporate a 
medium hydro variable, but the definitions of this variable vary so for the sake of simplicity 
and clarity, I have chosen to denote all hydropower plants with an installed effect of more than 
10 MW large in my thesis, as this is the practice at NVE, according to Selfors (2013).  
Included in the data set sent by Mr. Seming is the category “Pumps”. This category represents 
a technology that usually transfers water between a hydropower plant’s two reservoirs, using 
pumps, to control and regulate intake to the power plant, either on a seasonal or daily basis 
(Fornybar.no, 2013). Because pumps function as an addition to an existing power plant and 
not as a new plant, and because the number is quite insignificant, I have chosen to omit this 
category from my analysis.  
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To further look at the hydropower development, I will use cumulative data accessible from 
Statistics Norway, which run from 1970 to 20124. The data gives us the following graph: 
 
Graph 2. Source: SSB (2013b). Small Hydro ≤ 10 MW, Large Hydro > 10 MW 
* Source: SSB (1978), restricted information. 
The annual-based data I have collected consist of the accumulated number of hydropower 
stations each year, according to their sizes, and we can interpret this as the net development. 
What this this tells us is that when the development is negative, as with small hydro from 1992 
to 1993 where the number of small hydros decreased from 336 to 318, is that the net sum of 
opened and closed plants this year was negative 18. Adding the number of new power plants 
from Graph 1 in 1992 and 1993, which were two and five, respectively, more than 18 plants 
have likely shut down. The large hydro appears to have had a steady growth from 1974 until 
the mid-1990s, after which it somewhat flattened out. It is apparent from the data and graph 
that small hydros have had the most turbulent development, from a slow decrease into the 
1990s; to an interesting, steep upwards slope in the 2000s. To compare these two hydropower 
developments further, I decided to perform some relevant calculations.  
2.3.2 The Compound Annual Growth Rate (GAGR) 
Since the 1974 to 2012 data from Statistics Norway are annual and compounded, I chose to 
calculate the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR). This gives us the annual theoretical 
                                                 
4 The data from 1974 – 2011 was collected from SSB, while the data for 2012 is found at (NVE, 2013b). 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
H
y
d
ro
p
o
w
er
 P
la
n
ts
Year
New Hydropower Plants 1970-2012
Small Hydro Large Hydro Total Hydro
 28 
growth of each hydropower size for selected periods, if the development had been constant 
over these periods (NASDAQ, 2009).  
I have calculated the CAGR for nine-year periods5, as well as over the entire period from 1974 
to 2012. I have used the standard CAGR formula,  
  CAGR = (
𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
)
(
1
𝑁𝑜.  𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
)
- 1 
Listed in the table below are the results from my calculations. 
Hydropower Plants Development 
CAGR 
  Small Hydro Large Hydro Total Hydro 
1974 - 1982 -0,54 % 2,64 % 0,76 % 
1983 - 1992 0,17 % 1,07 % 0,59 % 
1993 - 2002 -0,14 % 0,43 % 0,14 % 
2003 - 2012 7,37 % 0,28 % 4,30 % 
1974 - 2012 1,39 % 1,04 % 1,26 % 
Table 1. Source: SSB (2013b) 
Small Hydro ≤ 10 MW, Large Hydro > 10 MW 
The results show that despite its rather volatile development, with periods of both negative 
and positive growth, small hydro has had the highest theoretical annual growth from 1974 to 
2012, with an estimated 1.39% annually. This is mainly due to its very high increase in the 
2000s, where the growth was 7.37% per year. Large hydros, on the other hand, have not 
experienced a theoretical negative growth in the selected periods, but the growth per year is 
quite low and shows a decreasing trend towards 2012. 
The Total Hydro line in Graph 1 and column in Table 1 represents the development of all 
hydropower plants, irrelevant of size. Both the interpretation of the graph and the CAGR of 
these data tells us that there has been an overall modest development of hydropower plants in 
this period. It is worth noticing the very modest development of 0.14% annually during the 
1990s, which supports the statements of Thue (2006). However, the CAGR estimations of the 
2000s are higher than ever, due to the recent increase in new small hydros.  
 
 
                                                 
5 With the first period (1974 – 1982) covering eight years so that it would fit the data. 
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2.3.3 The Relative Change 
Although the CAGR method is very useful when comparing different data over time, it could 
also be important to look at the actual relative change in the different hydropower plant sizes 
from year to year, by calculating 
𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒−𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
, as this could tell us something about 
trends. Because the data is cumulative, we are in fact talking about a form of net relative 
change, in accordance with the explanation given to Graph 2, but I will simply refer to this as 
the relative change. The results of these calculations tell the following story: 
We can see from Table A in Appendix B that the relative change for small hydros has mostly 
been concentrated around 0%, i.e. very little year-to-year change, especially during a period 
from mid-1980s to mid-2000s. Before and after this period, the changes in small hydro 
development seem to be more volatile, showing little sign of trends. Large hydros had a higher, 
positive relative change until the late 1980s, when this dropped to revolve around 0.00%, 
which is comparable to the results I have found earlier in this chapter. The interpretation is as 
follows; a relative decrease indicates a more modest development of hydropower plants 
compared to the year before, but still a positive development if the relative change is higher 
than 0.00%. For example, in 2010, there were 442 small hydros, up from 413 in 2009, which 
represents a 7.0% relative increase. By 2011, the net increase in small hydros was 115, 
resulting in 557 small hydros, and a relative increase by 26%. In 2012, the net number of small 
hydros “only” increased by 46 (an 8.2% relative increase), i.e. a positive development, 
however represented by a drastic decrease in the relative change. A stable growth would 
translate into a smooth transition from one year to another, like the relative change in small 
hydro during the period from 2003 to 2012, and large hydro’s period running from 1977 to 
1983, but besides these two, there seem to be few periods with stable year-to-year 
developments. The relative change in total hydropower development appears to be more 
tranquil – and positive – than the separate developments, perhaps indicating that an increase 
in one hydro size weighs out a decrease in the other, reflecting a possible substitution trend in 
the hydropower industry. 
2.4 The Hydropower Plants’ Application Process 
The governing body of Norwegian hydropower development is the Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), subjected to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. 
Its mission is to supervise the planning, development, and operation of hydropower plants, 
and make sure the different stages follow the governmental acts, specifically the Water 
Resources Act of 2000, the Planning and Building Act of 1985, and the Energy Act of 1990 
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(NVE, 2012a). Through the Planning and Building Act, NVE is subjected not only to the 
Norwegian government, but also to European Union Directives (NVE, 2009c). 
After settling agreements with potential landowners and other property-related business, 
project developers contact NVE with their proposals. There are three outcomes of developers’ 
first contact with NVE, depending on, amongst others, project size and interference in nature. 
First, if the proposed hydropower plant is very small – or the project involves an upgrade 
rather than a new development – and does not entail significant interference in nature, NVE 
can exempt it from the licensing process. The second, and most common outcome, is that NVE 
refers the developer to an official license application. NVE processes all license applications 
for hydropower plants with an effect of 10 MW or less, and this process involves public 
hearings and inspections, and ultimately a decision. The third outcome is that NVE forms a 
recommendation to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. This happens if the planned 
hydropower plant has a larger effect than 10 MW, or if the application falls under the Industrial 
Licensing Act of 1917 or the Act Relating to Regulations of Watercourses of 1917, as is often 
common with large hydropower plants with reservoirs (NVE, 2010b).  
NVE also has the authority to revise license terms, in order to secure that existing hydropower 
plants’ standards follows the regulations. By November 2013, the list of revision candidates 
includes 432 hydropower plants. The main goal of these revisions is to improve the 
environmental impact of older plants, and although NVE can impose measures that the 
hydropower plant owner must take, it is only the terms of the license, not the license itself, 
that are being revised (NVE, 2012c). One of the most common measures to achieve 
environmental improvements is by introducing minimum flow requirements. The goal of these 
is to secure that a hydropower plant, both reservoir or watercourse-based, does not dry out the 
watercourse and maintains the water quality, thus ensuring a flow of water that may be vital 
for the wildlife, or the scenery. NVE decides the minimum flow, in accord with the Water 
Resources Act, for each license application, and the given flow requirement will effectively 
reduce the total amount of water that the plant can use for electricity generation.  
2.4.1 A Walkthrough of a Standard Application Process 
Because most small hydro projects fall under the license regulations, this is what I will focus 
on further in my thesis. When developers submit a license application, one of NVE’s priorities 
when further processing the application is to determine the controversy of the hydropower 
plant, according to Arnulf Røkke, Head of Project Development at Småkraft. This includes 
the public hearings, mentioned above, which are used to establish the “public voice” in the 
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matter. If locals, politicians, or environmentalists raise concerns, the license applicant can 
address these concerns, and answer questions that the public may have. After this, NVE will 
make the decision whether the license should be granted or not, and if granted, the public may 
protest the decision. NVE is left with two options, either they have a noncontroversial 
application and approves the license, or the potential protests prevent an approval. In the latter 
case, the project developer can appeal, and NVE will send its decision to the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy. Here, caseworkers will review and process the appeal, and the Ministry 
subsequently makes its own decision, which is irreversible.  
It is worth mentioning that not all license applications are entitled to a public hearing; NVE 
determines whether this is necessary in the early stages of the process, to filter out “bad” 
projects. NVE has listed several issues that can act as deal breakers if found too severe, and 
among these we find projects that violate environmental acts and regulations, that clearly 
interfere with public interests, and projects based on incomplete applications (NVE, 2012b). 
Also listed is a relevant question of a project’s investment costs and expected revenue. NVE 
calculates its own realistic upper-limit revenue, and if the projected revenue exceeds this, NVE 
will contact the applicant and inform that they will reject the application if the applicant cannot 
reduce the investment costs. I will get back to a hydropower plant’s investment costs and 
revenue in Chapter 4. 
2.4.2 An Increase in License Applications and Change in Routines 
The Norwegian government founded the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Department 
(NVE) in 1921 and for several decades, it functioned as a governmental generator of 
hydropower. In 1986, its role as a hydropower developer ended when then-NVE demerged 
into NVE and Statkraft, and changed its name to Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Company. NVE was now solely an advisory body, and to emphasize this, the government 
changed the name once more in 1998, to the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (Thue, 2006). 
The procedures of the license application process have not changed significantly over the 
years, as the same fundamental acts and regulations are still in effect. However, NVE has 
attempted to speed up the process by introducing different kinds of prioritizations, with the 
most prominent being the Master Plan, Samlet Plan, approved by the Norwegian Parliament 
in 1986. This plan involved watercourses and hydropower projects being classified according 
to a potential conflict scale and costs, where projects placed low on the conflict scale were 
placed in Category I, and more controversial projects were placed in Category II. Category I 
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projects could apply for a license right away, while Category II projects were put on hold. The 
Parliament decided, in 2005, to exempt small hydro projects from the Master Plan scheme 
(NVE, 2013c). NVE introduced a new prioritization scheme in 2012, to deal with the 
increasing amount of applications, and they pledged to have all applications handed in before 
January 1 2013 reviewed and processed before 2017, to make the el-certificates system. This 
new scheme involves prioritizing applications according to their locations, and processing 
license applications within specific areas at the same time in so-called “packs”. By doing so, 
NVE reduces the pressure in its individual regional offices by evenly spreading out the 
ongoing application reviews, as well as deprioritizes areas with limited access to the power 
grid (NVE, 2012b).  
In the 2013 Political Platform, the new government introduced its aspiration to improve and 
shorten the license application process by transferring some of NVE’s jurisdiction to the 
municipalities, especially concerning licenses to small hydros (Office of the Prime Minister, 
2013, p. 62). Graph 3 on the next page shows the number of license applications NVE has 
received each year, as well as the number of approved applications. 
 
Graph 3. Source: NVE, via Kannick, H. (2013) 
From NVE’s data on licenses, we see that the number of applications started increasing 
significantly around 2004, before dropping, and then increasing again. We also see that despite 
the increased number of applications, the number of approved applications has had a steady 
growth, with certain drops, which at certain points leads to a low percentage of approved 
applications. In 2007 and 2012, for example, NVE approved only 25.7% and 27.2% of the 
applications, respectively. The gap is quite significant in some periods, which leads to queues 
at NVE.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
In this chapter, I intend to explain the methodology I have used in my thesis, and precisely 
why I chose the specific methods and tools. I have mainly based my thesis on qualitative data, 
with some quantitative support, and I shall clarify my reasons for doing so, and discuss other 
options, as well as possible errors that may arise in research like this. Furthermore, I will talk 
about my interviews – how I conducted these, and what possible errors such a source of 
information could entail.  
3.1 Empirical Study and Research 
When trying to determine the underlying cause or motivation for a certain situation, or simply 
trying to describe a large system or population, it is usually necessary to observe, investigate, 
and conduct experiments to achieve the important knowledge and information. Commonly 
known as empirical study, it is the cornerstone of researches and analyses, and naturally plays 
an important role in my thesis. We can utilize empirical research to either describe, explain, 
or predict situations, depending on what we wish to accomplish, and these three purposes may 
often intertwine (Jacobsen, 2000). The results of an empirical study will of course differ 
depending on your initial outlook, but according to Jacobsen (2000), we must be aware of two 
critical factors when conducting empirical researches. First, the study in question must be 
valid, i.e. what we are observing is in fact what we wish to observe, and second, the study 
must be reliable, which means that we should conduct it in a credible fashion with as few 
measurement errors as possible. If these two measurements are less than satisfactory, we 
cannot generalize the findings of the empirical research, and thus the study is not very relevant. 
Holme and Solvang (1998) stress the importance of a well-formulated and creative research 
question in an empirical study. Formulating – and limiting – a research question can often be 
the most challenging part of a study, and that the researcher must “attack” the research 
question with a critical mind, as it will largely control how you conduct your further studies 
(Holme and Solvang, 1998, p. 40). 
The focus of my thesis is mainly descriptive, as my goal is to investigate the factors driving 
and slowing down hydropower development in Norway. However, as my research question 
suggests, I am also hoping to be able to use the information I gather to say something about 
the future development; therefore my thesis will include a predictive part as well.  
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3.1.1 Case Studies 
In my research question, I have expressed my desire to thoroughly look into and determine 
various factors in the Norwegian hydropower industry and figure out how these affect the 
development. Thus, I found it reasonable to apply a case study method, defined by Yin (2009, 
p. 17) as way to illuminate and understand contemporary decisions, individuals, processes, 
and events. Through descriptive and qualitative case studies, a researcher is able to study a 
phenomenon in a “real life” context (Simons, 2009, p. 20). When designing a case study, one 
must consider the amount of cases that are relevant to analyze and investigate. Yin (2009) 
distinguishes between single-case studies and multiple-case studies, and describes a multiple-
case study as one where the study focuses on several units, and in each unit the case differ 
somewhat, resulting in several cases in total. According to Jacobsen (2000, p. 77), the 
aforementioned units can be single individuals, groups, organizations, or societies. The units 
a researcher examines in a case study must be restricted in space and time, meaning that the 
case study should focus on a limited number of industries, schools, companies, etc., and target 
a specific event or decision (Jacobsen, 2000, pp. 77-78). One can also use case studies to 
explore and understand the mechanisms of change (Simons, 2009, p. 23). Simons (2009) 
suggest using qualitative methods to provide a case study with relevant and detailed 
information, as these allow for an in-depth study of the experience and complexity of actions 
and policies in their “natural habitat”. 
As I was designing the case study for my thesis, I found that the definitions of a multiple-case 
study above seemed quite appropriate for my subject, as my focus, or case, would be on 
hydropower development and its corresponding decision-making, thus restricting the case in 
time. By interviewing companies, or units, in close contact with this development, with their 
own business models and agendas, the main case may split into several similar cases, which I 
then can analyze and compare.  
3.2 Different Methodological Approaches and Their Consequences 
When conducting an empirical study, there are several paths one can take in securing the 
relevant information, and all of these may corrupt the study. According to Jacobsen (2000), 
four categories of approaches are relevant in empirical studies, and these are deductive or 
inductive; qualitative or quantitative; individualistic or holistic; and close or distant 
approaches.  
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First, one must decide whether to address the study deductively or inductively. The former 
consists of the researcher creating her own expectations about the study, based on earlier 
empirical finds, and collect information to support these expectations. While being a useful 
tool for comparing earlier beliefs and theories, Jacobsen (2000) states that such an approach 
may “cloud” the researcher’s judgment in the gathering of information. When you are looking 
for a specific relationship, it is easy to only search for the information relevant for this 
relationship, and disregard other important factors, thus limiting the input of vital information. 
On the opposite side we find the inductive approach, in which the researcher address the study 
with an “open mind”, collecting all relevant data and information and uses this to create 
theories. The latter includes its own risks of interpretational errors. In my case, I went for a 
mix of these two, while considering the possible errors, as I will discuss later.  
The researcher must choose whether to go for a qualitative or quantitative approach. The 
former includes collecting data and information through personal interviews and observations 
of the relevant subjects, while the latter involves collecting data – usually numbers – that the 
researcher can interpret through statistical tools to say something about a large number of 
individuals. The choice of a qualitative or a quantitative approach connects to what you wish 
to achieve with your empirical study. A researcher can use a quantitative approach to gain a 
total perspective of the area of interest, and through a qualitative approach, a researcher can 
acquire transferable knowledge about a certain group and the impact of certain situations 
(Holme and Solvang, 1998).  
The individualistic and holistic approaches connect to how we understand and interpret certain 
circumstances, as explained by Jacobsen (2000). As individualistic approach focuses on the 
single individuals in large societies or organizations, and their actions and motivations to 
understand and draw conclusions about the collective opinions of a society, the holistic view 
centers on the ever-changing actions and motivations of individuals, for example at work or 
at home with their family. 
The goal of an empirical study is to produce results or theories that are transferable to other 
similar situations or societies, which other researchers may easily replicate or further develop. 
This is of course difficult if the original researcher influences the subject in any way that could 
distort the results. Jacobsen (2000) points out the researcher’s personal values as one of the 
most important reasons for “contaminated” results. Through a more distant approach, one may 
mitigate the possibility of non-transferable results, although critics of this approach argue that 
a closeness is necessary to understand fully the subjected individual.  
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3.3 Choice of Industry and Subjects of Interest 
As soon as I had figured out the topic of my thesis, I started working on a research question 
that could best reflect and answer the questions I had. Because of the importance of 
hydropower in Norway, both in the past and present, I limited my thesis to the Norwegian 
hydropower, which also shortened down the list of possible research questions. Initially, I was 
interested in comparing the Norwegian development of hydropower to that of other renewable 
resources, like wind and solar power, and look at the implementation of new instruments and 
methods. However, as the reader will see later in this thesis, the shares of wind and solar power 
in the Norwegian power industry are still quite insignificant, and the focus on new inventions 
varies greatly across the different actors in the hydropower industry. Previous empirical 
studies have looked at some of the important factors of the hydropower development, like the 
introduction of the el-certificates, and used data and information from the Swedish el-
certificates market to predict or explain how this would work in Norway, see for example 
Aune, Bye, and Hansen (2005). I therefore decided to study the hydropower development as 
a whole, and by doing so, identify the most common drivers and bottlenecks, according to 
actors in this industry. 
Because of the large number of hydropower plants, as well as the diversity of their owners, I 
found it reasonable to limit most part of my thesis to small hydropower plants – with an 
installed effect of 1.0 MW to 10 MW – for two reasons. First, the development of large-scale 
hydropower plants is arguably naturally impaired because of their sizes and restricted 
appropriate locations, and second, mini hydropower plants – with an installed effect less than 
1.0 MW – are often developed, owned, and operated by private persons, with whom it could 
be difficult to establish contact. That said, I am looking at the total hydropower development 
as a part of my supporting theory and analysis, as trends and focus change a lot over decades.  
In Norway today, there are several large companies focusing on small hydropower 
development and operation, and they have very different forms of ownership. The government 
and municipalities own shares in many power companies through subsidiaries. To acquire the 
information I needed to answer my research question, I decided to contact several small 
hydropower-developing companies, irrelevant of their ownership status, as this is difficult to 
match. In addition to contacting representatives with positions as developers in these 
companies, I have been in contact with other sources close to the development, which I will 
discuss further in Chapter 3.4.2. 
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According to the definitions in Jacobsen (2000), my thesis includes information from mostly 
respondents. These are in direct contact with a situation or subject, and in some way represent 
the actual group of study. Informants, on the other hand, are close to the relevant situation and 
has great knowledge about it, but do not represent the group. In my thesis, I have interviewed 
five respondents, of which four are included in my analysis.  In addition, I have received 
valuable information from representatives from NVE, whom I consider highly relevant when 
it comes to Norwegian hydropower development. I could naturally have interviewed 
informants, such as private citizens or environmentalist, as these certainly play a part in the 
social aspects of the Norwegian hydropower. Unfortunately, due to the restricted size and time 
working in this thesis, the social and environmental aspects are limited to the current 
respondents’ perspectives.  
3.4 Collecting the Data 
I have based my thesis on individual and personal interviews with respondents from the 
hydropower industry, as well as one interview and comments via e-mail. To support both the 
theoretical and analytical part of my thesis, I have collected secondary data and information 
from governmental sources in the form of quantitative data, as well as the relevant acts and 
regulations. The intention with this subchapter is to provide information about how to collect 
data and information accurately, and I will describe how I did this in order to answer my 
research question. 
3.4.1 Primary Data 
A qualitative approach involves a certain relationship with the respondent (Holme and 
Solvang, 1998). A researcher can collect qualitative data and information through interviews, 
observations, social experiments, and questionnaires, and we call the data a researcher collect 
directly – and for the first time – for primary data (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 124). When an empirical 
study involves a restricted number of respondents, as mine did, an interview is a good mean 
of collecting individual perceptions and interpretations concerning relevant phenomena 
(Jacobsen, 2000, p. 131). It is possible to conduct an interview in person, over the phone, or 
electronically via either a video conference or e-mail (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013, p. 118), and 
they all have their strengths and weaknesses. In face-to-face interviews, the researcher can 
easily clarify misunderstandings and doubt, but these interviews can involve travel costs and 
are somewhat time-consuming. Telephone and e-mail interviews, as well as video 
conferences, lack personal proximity and the researcher or respondent can terminate the 
interview without warning, but they are relatively cheap and very flexible (Sekaran and 
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Bougie, 2013). As the intention of my thesis in to identify essential, and underlying, situations 
in hydropower development, I conducted three personal interviews, with respondents from 
Småkraft, and Tafjord Kraftproduksjon, as well as Robert Rønstad, Project Manager for Small 
Hydro at the municipality of Norddal, who joined in at the meeting I had with Tafjord 
Kraftproduksjon. Due to the long travel distance to HelgelandsKraft’s headquarters, the 
respondent and I decided to conduct the interview via video conference, and because of a busy 
schedule, the respondent from BKK offered his information and help through e-mail. For my 
multiple-case study, I will compare the cases of Småkraft, Tafjord Kraftproduksjon, 
HelgelandsKraft, and BKK.  My interview and subsequent e-mail communication with Robert 
Rønstad will form the primary basis of my chapter on hydropower investments, as he provided 
me with valuable information concerning this subject. In addition, I have included some of the 
respondents’ knowledge and opinions in other chapters of my thesis, as this felt natural.  
3.4.2 Secondary Data 
In addition to the primary data I collected through interviews, I have also used secondary data 
to support my findings. Secondary data refers to information collected by other researchers, 
often through former empirical studies, and may involve books, governmental publications, 
census data etc. (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013, p. 116). The secondary data in my thesis consist, 
as mentioned earlier, mostly of qualitative data collected from governmental institutions like 
NVE and Statistics Norway, as well as governmental acts, and historical accounts of the 
hydropower industry in Norway. The qualitative data I collected are comprised of annual and 
quarterly data on electricity prices, electricity generation, as well as accounts of the number 
of hydropower plants in Norway. In some of the qualitative data, I have taken certain liberties. 
Most importantly, the data on prices and el-certificates values are not corrected for growth in 
inflation according to the consumer price index. However, because the secondary data are 
simply supplementing the primary data in my thesis, I have decided to disregard this, and 
interpret the data as I collected it, to give the reader a simple overview of the price 
development. As a preparation for the interviews, I used secondary data in the form of financial 
statements and press releases concerning the companies I was interviewing.  
3.5 The Interview Process 
In this part, I will discuss some theoretical factors that I believe play important roles before, 
during, and after an interview. In addition, I shall comment on how these different factors 
affected my interviews and thereby my information gathering.  
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3.5.1 The Structure of an Interview 
When conducting an interview, the researcher chooses the structure and order of the interview 
beforehand. According to Jacobsen (2000), the structure of an interview is either open, closed, 
or something in between, and Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p. 130) use the same definitions, 
using the terms unstructured, structured, and semi-structured, respectively. With little to no 
questions or order to follow, the interview is as a regular conversation, and we consider it an 
unstructured interview. On the other side, a researcher could have formulated questions with 
set answers for the respondent, referred to as a structured structure. A semi-structured 
interview is a mix of these two, where the researcher brings a set of prepared questions or 
topics, though mainly as an “anchor”. As I had a somewhat clear picture of what I needed to 
know to answer my research question, I chose to follow the semi-structured interview form. 
Incidentally, one considers this optimal for collecting information (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 133). 
Before conducting a semi-structured interview, a researcher usually works on the pre-
structure, defined by Jacobsen (2000, p. 132) as the process of determining the theme and 
topics of an interview. The pre-structuring puts the important topics in focus, and it prepares 
the researcher for the demanding information gathering ahead (Holme and Solvang, 1998). 
The best way to do this is by creating an interview guide (Jacobsen, 2000), which consists of 
subjects the researcher wish to bring up during the interview. I therefore created an interview 
guide based on the information I felt was needed to best answer my questions, see Appendix 
C. A part of the work that went into the pre-structure and interview guide consisted of studying 
hydropower plants, to avoid spending too much time during the interviews on what is 
essentially basic information. I constructed my interview guide to follow a simple pattern, with 
questions relating to the different topics were somewhat separated, to make the connections 
logical and simple to follow for the respondent. I focused on keeping the questions short and 
concise to avoid both confusion and leading questions, which could influence and affect the 
respondent’s true motives or thoughts (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). The main subject of the 
interviews was the obviously relevant subject of drivers and bottlenecks in the hydropower 
development, but I also decided to bring up subjects more indirectly related to this, so that I 
could, in addition to collect and compare statements across cases, make up my own mind 
concerning the development. By doing so, I was able to compare the responders’ answers to a 
total impression of the interviews, which in my opinion worked quite well. By studying the 
companies in advance, I could modify my interview guide to suit my responders. Because I 
have based my thesis on a topic that is not necessarily common knowledge, I did not have the 
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opportunity to test my questions on a well-informed subject in advance. However, I did consult 
friends and family to ensure that the wording of my questions was not leading or misleading, 
which could lead to bias, according to Sekaran and Bougie (2013).  
The time and location of an interview is often based on what is practical for the researcher and 
the respondent. Jacobsen (2000) identifies two locations, one that is natural for the respondent, 
and one that is artificial. A natural location is one that the respondent is familiar with, like in 
his home or at his office, while an artificial location is neutral and relatively unknown for both 
the researcher and the respondent. The location of an interview can affect the information 
collection process as the respondent may act differently in the two locations, and we know this 
as this as the context effect (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 134). I followed my respondents’ requests, and 
conducted the personal interviews in conference rooms at their workplace, which is quite 
natural for the respondent. This is also where I believe they feel the most comfortable when it 
comes to interviews concerning their work.   
During the interview, my goal was to assume an attentive, listening position, and by doing so 
gather information from the respondent (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 138). This includes both a mental 
and a physical component, and how the researcher conducts himself during the interview may 
easily affect the respondent and ultimately the information collected. Further, for an open 
stream of information to occur, it is vital with a certain trust or bond between the researcher 
and the respondent. I previously mentioned closeness in Chapter 3.2, and there are ways to 
establish a professional trust. I started by formally introducing myself, explained my research, 
and asked the respondent if he had any preliminary questions or comments (Jacobsen, 2000, 
pp. 136-137). It is all about being respectful, polite, and professional, and this was something 
I focused on to ensure an informative interview.  
According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), documentation of an interview can include audio 
and video recording, notes, and memory. A tape recorder allows the researcher to concentrate 
on the topics, as well as the dynamics of the interview, and the recording is available for further 
studying. The researcher should take notes as well for two reasons. First, it is a great way to 
show what you found important at the time of the interview (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 135). Second, 
you will be able to reference certain parts during the interview, to show attentiveness and 
interest for the topic as well as for the respondent. A tape recorder can cause uneasiness, so it 
is important to ask for permission to record the interview. The presence of a tape recorder 
introduced no protests in neither of my interviews, so I recorded the interviews while also 
taking notes, which was very helpful in my analysis.  
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Jacobsen (2000) states that although there are no rules when it comes to the duration of an 
interview, there are certain time aspects a researcher should focus on. An interview that lasts 
longer than 90 to 120 minutes will usually be quite tiresome for both the researcher and the 
respondent, and they may lose focus, while a 30 minutes interview may be too short to gather 
all information necessary, especially when conducting a semi-structured interview (Jacobsen, 
2000, p. 135). An optimal interview should last from 60 to 90 minutes, so I used this length as 
a template, and I informed my respondents about the desired length ahead for the interview to 
make sure that the interview did not feel rushed due to lack of time. The shortest interview I 
conducted lasted 40 minutes, while the longest lasted 77 minutes. When agreeing on a length 
of an interview beforehand with a respondent, a researcher limits the topics to the given time. 
Of course, a semi-structured interview where the respondent enjoys talking about the subject 
can run longer than anticipated, and therefore it is often up to the researcher to end the 
interview, and doing so in a respectful way (Jacobsen, 2000). At the end of my interviews, I 
expressed that I believed I had the information I needed in order to research the topic further, 
and asked the respondent if they had anything else they would like to add, or any questions 
concerning my thesis, which I happily answered.   
3.6 Analysis 
My focus during the interviews was to harness valuable information from the respondent, and 
later be able to analyze, verify, and report findings connected to this information (Kvale and 
Brinkmann, 2009, p. 177). The post-interview stages are important in empirical case studies, 
as we wish to compare the information gathered to other interviews or forms of collected data. 
Therefore, it is important to document the interview carefully, as mentioned in Chapter 3.5. 
After an interview, the researcher possesses large amounts of raw data that he has to form into 
transcribed data (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 175). Using a tape recorder makes the raw data as 
complete as possible, but transcribing an interview from a tape can be a tiresome job when the 
interviews last 60 to 90 minutes (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 180).  
Further, Jacobsen (2000, p. 178) argues that the researcher should transcribe the notes and tape 
from an interview as soon as possible after the interview is finished, and supplement the tape 
recording with the notes for the reason given earlier. I decided to follow this routine, and I 
transcribed my interviews the same day as my interviews, or the day after, to make sure that 
the information I got was fresh in my memory. Although my thesis is in English, I decided to 
conduct my interviews in Norwegian, so in the process of transcribing, I also translated the 
information I got. The next thing I did, after having translated and transcribed the interviews, 
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was to categorize the data, defined by Jacobsen (2000, p. 185) as a way of collecting the 
information we have from an interview into groups, depending on their topic or theme. This 
way, I could easily use the information to compare and analyze cases across several different 
units. After finishing the categorizing, it is often helpful to review the chosen categories and 
determine whether we have placed a piece of information in a wrong category (Jacobsen, 2000, 
p. 197). I then used the secondary data I have collected to support the findings and possibly 
find anomalies, to further strengthen my analysis.  
3.7 Ethical Aspects 
Ethical issues may easily arise when collecting primary data through interviews, where the 
researcher must take a respondent’s emotions and feelings into consideration. The level of 
ethical concern naturally depends on the topic of an interview, nevertheless, there are 
important decisions a researcher must make throughout the entire interview process (Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 63). As for my thesis, the subject of hydropower is quite non-
dramatic, but there are certainly aspects that can cause the respondent to become 
uncomfortable. When I worked with my interview guide, I realized for example that questions 
concerning a company’s willingness to invest in new inventions could easily sound judging. 
Therefore, I made sure to structure the interview guide to accommodate for such questions, to 
mitigate the possible discomfort these may cause.  
Further, in some cases the researcher can benefit from purposely withholding information from 
the respondent, as the subject may be offending and can cause biased answers (Jacobsen, 2000, 
p. 134). Whether this is ethically right, is for the researcher to determine. As I did not have an 
“ulterior motive” for my interviews, I clearly stated to my respondents the intentions of my 
thesis early on, as a means of establishing trust. I also sent most of my topics to the respondents 
in advance, further to establish trust and to give them a chance to prepare themselves, as some 
of the questions I had required some background information. The respondent may also 
withhold information, for either personal reasons or reasons connected to his employer. For 
example, one of the respondents informed me about a conflict with locals in the construction 
phase of a plant, but the company in question considers it a personal and irregular case, and 
the respondent therefore asked me to exclude this from my analysis, which I have done. This 
could of course cause errors in the results, as the next subchapter focuses on.  
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3.8 Validity and Reliability 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.1, in an empirical study I want to collect information that I can 
generalize and transfer to other, similar situations or cases (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 369). The terms 
validity and reliability are measures used to say something about the collected information in 
an empirical study. Related questions are “how well does the information fit the study?”, “did 
we observe what we were supposed to?”, and “was the information gathered correctly?” In the 
post-interview and analytical phase, it is important for the researcher to ask these questions, 
and to look carefully at the collected data, sources, and respondents (Jacobsen, 2000). The 
strength of the collected data and information relates to an empirical study’s internal validity 
(Jacobsen, 2000, p. 206). Whether the findings of an empirical study is generalizable and 
transferable depends on the findings external validity (Jacobsen, 2000, pp. 213-214). A way 
to determine the external validity of your results this is by reviewing other empirical studies, 
and see whether the findings of your study is comparable, thus somewhat transferable, to the 
findings of others, defined as replication logic by Yin (2009, pp. 43-44). 
As for my thesis, I have interviewed five respondents from the hydropower industry, and based 
on this I believe it is difficult to generalize my findings to apply to all companies in this 
industry. However, the respondents I have interviewed come from companies of different 
sizes, backgrounds, and business strategies. The respondents themselves were all male, but 
they varied in age, professional background, and education. I therefore believe I have been 
able to capture some of the differences in opinion and thought across the hydropower industry 
and that the internal validity of my findings is strong. By supplementing my findings with 
quantitative data, I believe I can further strengthen my findings.  
The reliability of the research depends on several factors throughout the planning, collecting, 
and transcribing of information, and may cause different results in otherwise identical studies 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 245). Similar to the aforementioned context effect, the 
respondent may also experience what Jacobsen (2000, p. 217) calls interviewer effect, which 
happens as the respondent reacts to the researcher’s gender, outfit, manners, or background. 
With this in mind, it is of course possible that the answers given during my interviews would 
have been slightly different had I been of the opposite sex, or in a different age group, but this 
is difficult to change. Therefore, to strengthen the general reliability of my findings, I chose 
to focus on my interview guide and interview behavior. As my respondents all were native 
Norwegians, I decided to conduct my interviews in Norwegian, to assure that what the 
respondents gave of information was not limited to their knowledge of the English language. 
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I have therefore spent much time transcribing the interviews from Norwegian to English, 
which was time-consuming, but of course necessary to avoid errors during transcription, as 
mentioned in Jacobsen (2000, p. 220). I am, however, very secure in my English proficiency, 
so I do not expect this to influence the reliability of my study.  
3.9 Weaknesses   
In this subchapter, I will talk about the difficulties and weaknesses that may arise in a 
research like mine, and how it is imperative to overcome such difficulties to produce the best 
results possible.  
First, when conducting an empirical research, there is always the potential risk of 
measurement and interpretation errors as listed earlier in this chapter. The researcher may 
inadvertently “create” the results during the study, due to what Jacobsen (2000, p. 18) calls 
the research effect, and he highlights an experiment conducted in a workplace, where the 
participants knew that researchers were observing them, and therefore acted accordingly 
when subjected to various stimuli. We know this as the Hawthorne effect6, and this may 
easily affect any empirical study where a researcher intrudes in a subject’s personal or 
professional life. The Hawthorne effect will to some degree always be present, but by 
focusing on this and thoroughly designing the study, one is able to mitigate the effect, and 
produce the most valid and reliable results possible.  
Second, in addition to validity and reliability, some other factors will affect the outcome of an 
empirical study. Sekaran and Bougie (2013, p. 22) describe the damage that could follow a 
subjective interpretation of research results. When a researcher does not utilize her objective 
analytical skills when processing the collected data, the result is misleading conclusions 
largely based on the researcher’s own thoughts, opinions, and values. If the researcher is able 
to stay objective throughout the study, the results produced will be more scientific, and 
naturally more transferable. Although it is difficult to be your own judge when it comes to 
objectivity and subjectivity, I do believe I have completed this study with as much objectivity 
as possible. It also helps that the subject of hydropower does not exactly blur any lines 
concerning ethical or morality issues, from which, of course, it could be harder to distance 
oneself. The researcher can also make certain errors during the analysis and interpretation of 
                                                 
6 Elton Mayo was the researcher of the experiment, conducted in the U.S. in the 1920-30s, where he studied how the physical 
work environment affected the employees (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 19). 
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the collected information, that could lead to distorted results, and according to Jacobsen (2000, 
p. 378), one of these errors is reading too much into the collected information or data. This 
easily connects to the objectivity factor, and a researcher must be careful in his interpretations 
to avoid this. To make sure that results are based on the actual information it is important with 
a critical mindset during the interpretation, and one way to demonstrate this is by including 
direct quotes in the analysis (Jacobsen, 2000, p. 200). Because I translated the interviews from 
Norwegian to English, I had the respondents validate their respective quotes, to increase the 
strength of my analysis. 
The third weakness that may affect the results of my empirical study relates to the study 
samples. As mentioned, the number of respondents in my thesis is not necessarily enough to 
generalize across the industry. However, when we talk about generalizing in a multiple-case 
study, we do not apply the same definitions that the general empirical studies are based on, 
see for example Sekaran and Bougie (2013, p. 22). I wish to collect is the respondent’s 
experiences and thoughts on the subject of Norwegian hydropower, and use this information 
to see if I can determine differences and similarities between the case-companies. As the reader 
will see in Chapter 6, some of the companies I have interviewed connects through their parent 
companies, such as BKK, Statkraft, and ultimately the government. They are major players in 
the Norwegian hydropower industry, and it is difficult to circumvent these when doing 
research on small hydropower. However, my impression from the interviews is that the 
respondents spoke very clearly on behalf of themselves and company that employs them, and 
never mentioned the parent companies. I therefore chose not to go into the specifics of 
ownership, as I do not expect this to be an issue in my thesis. The respondents seem very 
competent when it comes to the subject of hydropower, therefore I consider their opinions and 
remarks valid and well thought through, and most likely somewhat comparable to those of 
people in the same positions in other power companies or hydropower investment companies. 
3.10 Summary 
I have described how I collected the information needed for answering the question I posed in 
this thesis, and I explained that I have based my thesis on a multiple-case study. I intend to 
compare the different cases mainly using primary data collected through interviews with 
respondents from the case companies, supported by additional primary and secondary data. 
Moreover, I have discussed the pitfalls I find relevant for my empirical study, and clarified 
how I intend to avoid these to procure the most accurate data and information, and 
subsequently construct the most appropriate analysis, and results.  
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Chapter 4: Investments in Hydropower 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the development of hydropower in Norway has changed quite a lot 
over the years, and a shift in focus has occurred. Less interference in nature has been a desired 
target, shifting hydropower companies from large hydro installations to small hydros. So, what 
does this mean for the investments that power companies make in hydropower? In this chapter, 
I will present a general investment plan for small hydros, based on information graciously 
given by representatives from Småkraft and Tafjord Kraftproduksjon, as well as Robert 
Rønstad, Project Manager for Small Hydro at the municipality of Norddal.  
4.1 General Information 
When performing the investment analysis for a hydropower project, the developer must 
consider several important factors, like future revenue, operating costs, and reinvestments. 
There is a risk factor connected to the future electricity prices and expected governmental 
attitude towards hydropower, and the reinvestments factor takes into account the wear and tear 
on the hydropower plant and its equipment. Naturally, it is not always easy to determine the 
precise parameters, but the respondents I have interviewed seem to have a somewhat similar 
approach to get the most accurate investment analysis for a hydropower project. Since the 
output of a hydropower plant is measured in kWh, developers use this term when considering 
the revenues and costs of a project, i.e. they estimate parameters in their kr/kWh or øre/kWh 
equivalents, and use these in their analyses. The developer will then determine whether the 
estimated revenue and costs are economically viable before starting an eventual license 
application. As mentioned earlier, NVE conducts its own investment analyses of the 
applicants, which they use as a benchmark in the application process.  
Today, power companies and landowners base their future revenues on two income streams; 
the price the amount of sold electricity and the income from the el-certificates. Both of these 
parameters involve certain risks, as they are both market based and thereby subject to sudden 
changes, which I will describe further in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Initial Investment Costs 
The initial investment in a hydropower plant depends on the size of the project, and the 
developer calculates a project’s investment estimate in kr/kWh, which I will refer to as the 
investment indicator. This estimate takes the sum of development expenses, like technical 
equipment, materials, preparatory costs, and perhaps unforeseen expenses, and divide it by the 
estimated annual average generation multiplied by one million to get the estimate in kWh.  
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𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 (𝑘𝑟/𝑘𝑊ℎ) =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐺𝑊ℎ) ∗  1 000 000
 
We can interpret the investment indicator as a benchmark for how much a hydropower plant 
should earn per kWh generated to be completely debt-free within a year. It depends on 
expected production, and leaves out uncertain measures like future electricity prices. However, 
developers must take into account at least two potential factors when estimating the 
denominator in this formula. First, they estimate this based on the Norwegian weather 
throughout the year. This is of course hard to predict, and a dry year can decrease the 
denominator, effectively increasing the investment in kr/kWh, and vice versa. Second, it is the 
effect of the turbines and the general efficiency of the hydropower plant’s separate parts that 
determine the annual average generation, and this is of course subject to change as the 
equipment wears out.  
Mr. Rønstad has provided me with an investment analysis of a hydropower plant with an 
installed effect of 1.0 MW, i.e. a mini hydro. This project has a drop height of 353 meters, and 
the analysis suggests a Pelton turbine for this hydropower plant. The annual average 
generation of the project is 6.127 GWh, which results in an annual income of kr. 1 838 072, 
based on an electricity price of 30 øre/kWh. Through experience-based information given by 
NVE, an estimated investment cost of this project – including technical equipment, pipeline, 
and infrastructure – is kr. 18 858 888, which results in an investment indicator of 3.08 kr/kWh, 
according to the formula given above. In this analysis, it is the pipeline and its accompanying 
tunnel that hold the largest shares, with 15% and 28% of the total investment costs, 
respectively. These costs are depending on the topography and geology of the potential site, 
and may increase significantly in areas with mountains or stony grounds. The turbine and the 
intake, usually considered the most vulnerable parts of a hydropower plant, account for about 
17% of the initial investment. 
Each individual power company, depending on their attitude towards risk and future earnings, 
sets the upper profitability indicator. Through my interviews, I have established that the 
maximum investment limit seems to be quite transferable from one company to another, 
especially when considering small hydros. According to Arnulf Røkke, a project with a 
realistic estimated investment indicator of 1.5 to 4.0 kr/kWh is most likely a profitable project, 
accounting for future dividends and other financial goals. Naturally, these goals may differ 
between power companies and landowners, thus creating a difference in upper investment 
limit. Per Kåre Skudal, Project Developer at Tafjord Kraftproduksjon, points out that an 
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investment up to 5.0 kr/kWh is justifiable for landowners whom are able to fulfill their 
commitments with less focus on immediate dividends. Developers also use the initial 
investment indicator when seeking financial support for a planned project. Rønstad explains 
that he uses an upper investment limit of 3.5 kr/kWh when analyzing projects, and with this, 
or a lower, investment cost; private developers are usually able to get the project fully financed 
through a bank. Considering the fact that mini hydros normally demand a kr. 15 million 
investment, a partially or fully financed loan is often necessary for landowners to realize their 
projects. For small hydros, Røkke estimates an average investment cost of kr. 30 to 50 million, 
and Småkraft has developed hydropower plants in the kr. 16 million category, as well as some 
that have crossed the kr. 100 million mark.  
Due to the uncertainty connected to the electricity prices and el-certificates value, a 
hydropower developer usually calculates a project’s profitability with relatively conservative 
electricity prices, and often both with and without the el-certificates income, to get a clear 
view of the future profits. Both Rønstad and Skudal consider a long-run electricity price of 30 
øre/kWh a conservative estimate. For a kr. 15 million hydropower plant with the income 
mentioned above, and the regular operating costs, Rønstad suggests that an initial investment 
loan can be down-paid within 20 to 22 years, i.e. about half of the financial 40 year lifespan 
of a small hydro.  
4.3 Reinvestment in Equipment 
In an investment analysis, a developer generally calculates a lifespan of 40 to 60 years, 
depending on the size of the project. This is mainly a financial measure, used to calculate the 
net present value of an investment, based on the period the developer expects the hydropower 
plant to generate an income, and does not necessarily reflect the actual planned operation of a 
hydropower plant.  
During the lifespan, it is, however, necessary with reinvestments in new equipment, as it is 
unreasonable that all parts of a hydropower plant should last as long as 40 years or more. 
According to Rønstad, a revising of the plant is performed every 10 to 15 years, in which the 
plant is thoroughly reviewed and the required reinvestments are made. The aforementioned 
wear on the intake and turbine is the most common reason for reinvestment, which can cause 
some financial distress if not included in the early stages of the development. Due to the rather 
frail nature of mechanical equipment, routine maintenance of the hydropower plant is 
imperative, throughout the year, to reduce the risk of system failure. 
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4.4 Operating Costs 
With cold winters and relatively warm summers, hydropower plants in Norway experience 
quite a change in water input during a year, especially those based in watercourses. As I have 
explained earlier, a plant’s electricity output is measured for both summer and winter, and the 
investment analysis described in Chapter 4.2 denotes Summer from May 1 to September 30, 
and Winter from October 1 to April 30. Summer accounts for 62.5% of the annual average 
generation, while Winter accounts for the remaining 37.5%. With this difference in electricity 
generation, it is clear that a hydropower plant must be able to handle quite different water 
input, depending on the season. While the technology today in most cases will allow for 
variation in water input, one must consider other factors connected to the changing of the 
seasons that may damage the plant in any way. One of the largest posts in the operation budget 
is protecting the plant against destructive watercourse sediments. I mentioned earlier the small 
pool that developers install in front of the intake in watercourse hydropower plants, and how 
this has a protective function. According to Skudal, the pool catches some of the heavier 
sediments that the water carries, before entering the plant, thus releasing some of the pressure 
on the intake. Consequently, owners must empty the pool from time to time.  
Lighter watercourse sediments and leaves will continue to, and stop at, the intake. In most 
cases, this will lead to an accumulation of debris, which owners or those in charge must remove 
manually. Skudal explains that during the fall, it is often necessary to remove leaves and such 
from the intake up to two times a day, which of course increases operation costs. In general, 
developers estimate the operating costs based on calculations for each planned hydropower 
plant, and convert them to øre/kWh in the investment analyses. Although it is difficult to say 
without a specific project, Røkke estimates the typical operating costs to be around 2.7 
øre/kWh, and Skudal suggests that an operating cost of 3-5 øre/kWh is feasible. Both of these 
estimates are comparable to the one in the investment analysis provided by Rønstad, where 
the miscellaneous operating costs – excluding costs connected to rent, accounting, and 
amortization – accounts for 4.9 øre/kWh. However, because a hydropower plant’s lack of need 
for fuel, its operating costs are significantly lower than other electricity generating plants, like 
nuclear power plants or coal/ gas-fired power plants. Martin-Amouroux (2004) estimates that 
while it is unusual that the operating cost in its kWh equivalent exceeds 25% of the total costs 
of a hydropower plant, they can account for as much as 40% for nuclear power plants, and 70 
to 80% of a coal or gas-fired power plant’s investment.  
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4.5 Summary 
As we have seem in this chapter, investments in mini and small hydros can be quite large, 
especially from a landowner’s point of view. A landowner hoping to generate electricity, for 
example for his farm, will most likely not be able to invest kr. 15 million in a hydropower pant 
out his own pocket, and is therefore depending on investors, or a bank willing to provide 
financial aid through a loan. To secure such a loan, the watercourse in question must be able 
to secure an effective electricity generation through a high amount of GWh output, thereby 
decreasing the investment indicator. The respondents in my thesis suggested that a desired 
investment indicator is 3.5 kr/kWh or below, with which one is often able to secure an 
investment loan. A power company or a landowner must also take into consideration the risk 
of unexpected changes in future electricity prices, which will greatly affect the income, thus 
the need for an initial investment analysis. However, as we have seen, the initial capital costs 
accounts for a large amount – more than 75% – of a hydropower plant’s total costs, according 
to Martin-Amouroux (2004), making the regular operation and maintenance costs in the future 
relatively low.   
It is also apparent that the mechanical equipment of a hydropower plant poses a risk for 
developers. During the five months usually considered summer, the incoming waterpower 
results in a 60% increase in electricity generation compared to the seven winter months7, 
making year-round maintenance and supervision to secure the equipment fundamental parts 
of the hydropower plant operation. The instrumental components of a hydropower plant are 
expensive, and their limited lifespan makes it necessary with relatively large reinvestments 
throughout the operation of the plant, which may come as a financially devastating surprise if 
neglected in the early stages of planning.  
Despite the risks of changes in future income due to the various reasons described above, 
Røkke, Rønstad, and Skudal all seem to be quite optimistic when talking about the general 
investment analysis for a hydropower plant as long as you take the future risk into account and 
estimate the investment with conservative figures and calculations.  
 
                                                 
7 Based on Rønstad’s calculations: Production at 3.829 GWh during Summer, and 2.298 GWh during Winter. 
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Chapter 5: Electricity and El-Certificates 
While projects involving newer forms of renewable energy sources, like wind power, are often 
eligible for financial investment support through governmental-owned Enova, the seasoned 
hydropower relied solely on the earnings of sold electricity to market price from 1991 until 
the introduction of the el-certificates on January 1 2012 (Skudal, 2013). In this chapter, I will 
first look at the evolution of the electricity prices since the late 1990s, which seemed to be the 
turning point for small hydro development, as seen in Chapter 2.3.1. Second, I will explain 
how the el-certificates work in Norway today, and present the development of the el-
certificates’ value.  
5.1 Electricity Prices  
With the deregulation of the market in 1991 came new solutions for the distribution and sale 
of electricity, as described in Chapter 2.2.12. The Energy Act opened up for competition in 
the wholesale market, and power companies lost their exclusive supply rights (Bergman et al, 
2000, p. 125). In 1993, the government put Statnett Marked, a subsidiary of Statnett, in charge 
of the Norwegian power exchange, and there were no restrictions on membership – any 
producer, consumer, or trader could participate in the exchange. In 1996, as the Swedish power 
market joined in, Statnett Marked changed its name to Nord Pool, becoming the first cross-
borders power market in the world (Nord Pool Spot, 2012a). Since then, the Nord Pool power 
exchange has grown to include the power markets of Denmark and Finland, gathering the 
entire Nordic power market on one exchange. In 2008, the financial component of Nord Pool 
was sold to NASDAQ OMX Commodities, while Nord Pool Spot became in charge of running 
the power market, which soon included the two Baltic countries Estonia and Lithuania. The 
currency used in Nord Pool Spot is Euros, and they measure the prices in EUR/MWh. This 
means that usually when we are talking about electricity prices in kr/kWh, we have not only 
converted from MW to kW, but also considered the appropriate exchange rate. 
At Nord Pool Spot, one can trade electricity much like any other commodity. The Nordic 
Exchange follows the principles of a traditional voluntary pool model, where producers can 
submit their goods to the pool, whose mission is to function solely as a third-party handler 
(Harris, 2006, p. 165). Nord Pool Spot operates with two markets, a day-ahead market and an 
intraday market, named Elspot and Elbas, respectively (Nord Pool Spot, 2013a). The market-
based price, based on supply and demand, is predominantly determined in the Elspot market, 
where most of the trade for delivery the next day happens. The seller, in our case an owner of 
a hydropower plant, decides the quantity of electricity he can deliver and to what price, while 
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the buyer on the other side determines how much he needs and is willing to pay. The seller 
and buyer then register their order in the auction-based Elspot trading system. As the deadline 
for submitting orders and offers passes at 12:00 CET, the system price is set. This price marks 
the equilibrium between hourly generation and consumption, which is the reference price of 
the day, and we can describe it as somewhat theoretical. The reason for this is that the pool 
bases the system price on no transmission bottlenecks, i.e. a free flow of electricity throughout 
the Nordic market.  
However, each country’s network operator divides the country into so-called bidding areas 
based on transmission capacity, and this capacity, calculated for every hour, decides the 
eventual area price. If the electricity flow to or from an area exceeds the given capacity, the 
mechanisms of the pool calculates the area price to reduce the stress on the grid through the 
supply and demand theory. The mechanism introduces the grid constraint in the calculations, 
effectively increasing the price if the area experiences electricity scarcity, motivating power 
companies to produce more, or decreasing the price if the area has an abundance of generated 
electricity (Nord Pool Spot, 2013b). Nord Pool Spot uses its intraday market – the Elbas 
market – to support the Elspot market by allowing for almost immediate trades even after 
12:00 CET. This may be necessary if the market powers in either the supply or the demand 
side malfunction because of unforeseen events in the electricity markets, like the temporary 
shutdown of a large power plant (Nord Pool Spot, 2013c).  
An article in SINTEF (2007) explains that the basis of electricity prices in the Nordic market 
lies in the costs of generating the electricity – the power plants with high marginal costs drive 
the prices up, which is why we see fluctuations in prices throughout the year. Hydropower 
plants are, as mentioned earlier, relatively cheap to operate, so in periods with warm 
temperatures the hydropower-generated electricity can deliver a large percentage of the total 
supply, decreasing the electricity prices. However, as the temperature sinks, power plants fired 
by natural gas, coal, or oil, must generate electricity to meet the demand, increasing the 
marginal costs, thus increasing the electricity price.  
5.1.1 The Development of Electricity Prices in Norway 
The electricity prices were quite low after the introduction of the Energy Act in 1991. Thue 
(2006) lists full reservoirs and higher temperatures as two of the main reasons, while the article 
in SINTEF (2007) gives credit to the effectiveness of the newly liberalized electricity market, 
as power companies in the 1980s sold the abundant electricity generated cheap to Sweden, 
leaving the Norwegian electricity consumers with most of the costs. 
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Data on annual Norwegian electricity prices for households from SSB, running from 1993 to 
2012 show that the electricity price differs quite a lot between households, agriculture, energy 
intensive industries, and wood processing industries. I have chosen to just include the 
households variable, as I consider this the most relevant when it comes to the public opinion 
on electricity prices. Graph 4 illustrates this development. 
 
Graph 4. Source: SSB (2013c). 
My calculations reveal that the average price during this period was 26.98 øre/kWh, 
represented by the horizontal red line in the graph. As we can see, the price fluctuates quite a 
lot, and there seems to be signs of a break, i.e. a discrete change at certain date (Stock & 
Watson, 2012, p. 598), in 2001/02. Holstad and Pettersen (2011) argue that the significant 
increase in electricity prices during this period comes as a reaction to higher prices of oil, coal, 
and natural gas, which raises the marginal costs of power plants based on these fuels.  
To look at the impact of the price of petroleum on electricity prices, I have collected data on 
the historical spot price of Brent Blend, which is the benchmark for the North Sea oil. Graph 
5 on the next page shows the price of electricity for households combined with the price of 
Brent Blend. 
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Graph 5. Source: SSB (2013b) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013). 
The data from the U.S. EIA tell us that the 1990s was a period with relatively low and stable 
oil prices, and that the oil price has in fact experienced quite a growth since 2002, with the 
exception of a sudden drop around 2008, most likely due to the global recession. When 
comparing the oil and electricity prices, we see that the patterns are very similar, with an 
almost identical path during the 1990s. From the early 2000s, both series share a resembling 
development, after which they appear to be moving in a coherent fashion. Worth noticing is 
the stabilization of the oil prices from 2011, and the sudden drop in electricity prices for 
households at the same time. When we look at the quarterly data on electricity prices since 
1998, represented by Graph 6, we get a clearer picture of the seasonal trends. 
 
Graph 6. Source: SSB (2013d). 
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The quarterly data supports the argument made in the SINTEF (2007) article that there is a 
connection between electricity prices and time of year, and we see that the lower temperatures 
in the winter usually increase the price, as shown by the spikes that occur around the first and 
fourth quarter of each year. Two points are worth pointing out. First, the quite dramatic 
increase in the beginning of 2003, where the price increased to 62.4 øre/kWh. Second, the 
“missing” spikes in the winters of 2003/04, 2005/05, and 2011/12, when the electricity price 
declined from the fourth quarter to the first quarter. One explanation for the relatively low 
electricity prices these winters can be full reservoirs due to heavy precipitation during the year, 
diminishing the need for expensive-fueled electricity generation.  
In the previous chapter, I briefly talked about hydropower developers’ conservative estimate 
for future electricity prices, which currently revolves around 30 øre/kWh. According to 
Skudal, owners of hydropower plants base their estimates on the Elspot price, which is the 
actual price they get for the electricity they deliver. To get more knowledge about this exact 
price path, I collected data on the annual reference spot price since 1998, and compared this 
to the Brent Blend spot price, see Figure 1 in Appendix D. The average Elspot price was in 
this period 25.35 øre/kWh, though seemingly weighted down by the low Elspot price before 
2002. If I adjust the calculation to find the average Elspot price from 2002 to 2012, the result 
is 29.86 øre/kWh. Once again, we see a similar pattern of the electricity price and the oil price. 
This is of course because of the price path of Elspot is almost identical to the electricity price 
for households, albeit constantly a little lower. Because the Elspot data was restricted to 1998 
and onwards, I decided to use the electricity price for households going back to 1993 to 
illustrate the electricity price path in this chapter.  
5.2 El-Certificates 
The El-certificates system is an incentive-based instrument used by governments to increase 
the national interest for – and hopefully, the development of – renewable energy sources. The 
desired targets are power companies, developers, industries, and others that deal with or 
generate electricity, and what it does is introducing a second income for those who invest in 
renewable energy.  
5.2.1 Background 
The Kyoto Protocol first introduced a way for producers of renewable energy to make money 
on their clean energy through its three market-based mechanisms Emissions Trading, Joint 
Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism. These mechanisms puts a price on 
carbon, which countries can trade in the international carbon market (UNFCCC, 2013b). The 
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Emissions Trading scheme involved the UNFCCC assigning a certain amount of pollution 
permits to each participating country, based on their emissions and reduction goals. Countries 
could then sell excess permits, i.e. if they polluted less than expected, to countries that 
exceeded their goals. The Clean Development Mechanism opened up for countries to harness 
renewable energy through projects in developing countries; while the Joint Implementation 
scheme let developed countries work together on renewable energy projects. However, 
economists and environmentalists have raised concerns about these mechanisms, see for 
example Talberg and Nielson (2009), fearing that they may lead to exploitation of developing 
countries, as well as a false sense of “green action” in developing countries due to renewable 
energy project that are in fact accredited someone else.  
The el-certificates system is more restricted, as they usually are confined within one nation, 
but the goal is the same: reduce national CO2 emissions by rewarding developers of renewable 
energy. Sweden introduced the el-certificates system on May 1 2003, and on January 1 2012, 
the joint Swedish-Norwegian certificates system went into effect, with the collective goal of 
increasing renewable energy-based electricity generation by 26.4 TWh – which accounts for 
the electricity consumption of about half of Norwegian households (NVE, 2013d) – by 
December 31 2020. The system includes all power plants based on renewable energy, such as 
wind, hydro, wave, and geothermal power, to mention some. The Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, the Norwegian system’s legislative body, decided that all power plants built after 
September 7 2009 were eligible for el-certificates, making the system retroactive. Also 
included are upgrades of existing hydropower plants within the same period, as long as the 
developer can demonstrate a permanent increase in the upgraded plant. However, it is only the 
new electricity generated that is eligible for el-certificates. 
5.2.2 How They Work 
NVE manages the el-certificates, which Statnett then distributes to electricity-generating 
companies or persons for each new MWh generated by the use of renewable energy sources, 
who will receive such certificates for 15 years. The government finances the system through 
the electricity suppliers, enforcing an obligation to buy el-certificates, thus securing the supply 
and demand needed to set the value of the el-certificates (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
2012b). Electricity suppliers deal with this extra cost by adding a fee to the consumers’ 
electricity bill, meaning that the el-certificates are in the end consumer-financed. 
In determining the value of the el-certificates, one must look at the market mechanisms. First, 
NVE determines which power plants that are eligible for receiving el-certificates through the 
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Electric Certificates Act, and informs the distributer, Statnett. This part of the supply function 
is somewhat fixed as it is determined by the act, and of course the number of new eligible 
power plants. The Electric Certificates Act’s §16 sets the demand, thus this side of the 
valuation process is also somewhat fixed, and possible to determine in advance. Nevertheless, 
the value of the el-certificates varies quite a lot, posing a risk of over-valuation to developers 
of hydropower. How is this possible? 
In fact, it is the government, through the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, who decides the 
final “mobile” demand, because electricity supplies do not have to buy el-certificates to cover 
their entire supply. A quota obligation rate is set for each year until the final year of el-
certificates in 2035, 15 years after the system closes. In 2013, the quota obligation for 
electricity suppliers was 4.9% of their total supply, and it is expected to increase until its peak 
of 18.3% in 2020, after which is will slowly decline to .9% in 2035, as described in the Electric 
Certificates Act, §17, see Graph 7. The rates are set to reach the desired target of 13.2 TWh 
by 2020, i.e. half of the combined Swedish-Norwegian new renewable energy target. Included 
in the graph is also the Swedish quota obligation, represented by the blue line. 
 
Graph 7. Source: The Electric Certificates Act of 2012, §17 and Energimyndigheten (2012). 
5.2.3 Value of El-Certificates 
As noted in the section above, the value of the el-certificates fluctuates. The Swedish and 
Norwegian governments have carefully estimated the quota obligation rates to encourage the 
desired amount of new renewable energy, and to secure the value of the el-certificates as best 
they can. However, because the system base the quotas on the amount of electricity supplied, 
the value is prone to changes as electricity generation and consumption shift. In its estimations, 
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the legislative Ministry assumed an annual increase in electricity consumption of .3%, 
although they note that this is hard to predict (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2010).  
Thus, if the quota obligation is too high, compared to the actual amount of new renewable 
electricity generated, the value of the el-certificates will increase, and vice versa (Energi 
Norge, 2011). The development of the el-certificates’ value is shown in Graph 8 below. 
 
Graph 8. Source: Svensk Kräftmekling (2013). 
The vertical line represents Norway’s entrance into the joint Swedish Norwegian market on 
January 1 2012, and as we can see, the price has indeed varied over the years, from close to 
40 öre/kWh8 in 2008, to 15 öre/kWh in the beginning of 2012. Skudal states that he operates 
with a conservative el-certificates estimate of 15 øre/kWh, which appears to be a little below 
the historical average spot price. 
The Swedish and Norwegian governments will also evaluate the el-certificates system from 
time to time, at so-called checkpoints. The first checkpoint is in 2015, and the agenda of these 
is to secure that the market functions as desired, and make necessary adjustments concerning 
the quota obligation, length of the system, and so on (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
2011).  
5.3 Electricity Generation 
In Chapter 2.3.1, I presented the development of hydropower plants the past 40 years, and in 
this chapter, I have thus far described the electricity prices and the underlying supply and 
                                                 
8 We measure the value of El-Certificates in Swedish kronor (SEK). The past years the value of 100 SEK has been equal to 
about 85 NOK (Norges Bank, 2013), thus the value of the El-Certificates is a little lower in NOK. 
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demand in the Nordic market. Another factor I feel it is important to include in this thesis is 
the electricity generation, and how this has evolved through the years of varying number of 
new hydropower plants and electricity prices. Norway is one of the world’s largest consumers 
of electricity per capita (EEA, 2012), but does the national electricity generation meet the 
demand? As we can see from Figure 2 in Appendix D, this depends on the time of year. During 
the summer months, consumption is lower than generation, resulting in a national electricity 
surplus, ready for export. During the winter, however, the Norwegian electricity generation 
does not always meet the demand, resulting in a need for import. Graph 9, below, shows the 
total monthly electricity generation from 1993 to 2013, together with the amount of electricity 
generated by hydropower, to illustrate the idea that hydropower cannot always deliver, as 
mentioned in Chapter 5.1. 
 
Graph 9. Source: SSB (2013e) 
The data show a clear seasonal pattern, with high generation during the winter and low during 
the summer, as expected. However, the electricity generation from year to year seem 
surprisingly stable, and only a slight upwards trend is detectable when looking closely at the 
data. Further, as visible by the red, and sometimes indistinguishable, Total Generation line, 
other sources of power have played a role in the total electricity generation since late 2008 and 
onwards. Graph 10 on the next page shows the shares of the three main power sources in 
Norway, hydropower, wind power, and thermal power, where the latter consists of power plant 
heated by either natural gas or biofuels. The graph shows a somewhat decreasing importance 
of hydropower, although at its lowest in June 2010, we are still talking about a 91.65% share. 
The share of wind power in Norwegian electricity generation appears to have grown since 
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2004, claiming 1.44% of the total generation at its peak in October 2012, yet reduced to 1.16% 
by September 2013.  
 
Graph 10. Source: SSB (2013e) 
Over the entire period, hydropower holds an average of 98.28% of the total electricity 
generation in Norway, but the actual share in September 2013 was 95.78%. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have concentrated on the Norwegian electricity prices, generation, and 
consumption, as well as characterized the el-certificates system and described the mechanisms 
behind it. The electricity prices appear to have permanently increased since the 1990s, 
resulting in a higher income for hydropower plants. There are also clear signs of seasonal 
trends in the prices, indicating restricted supply from Norwegian hydropower plants during 
colder periods, which could account for the increasing share of other energy sources in the 
total Norwegian electricity generation. As for the el-certificates system, this seems to be based 
on thorough calculations concerning electricity generation and consumption, even so, the 
value of the certificates still fluctuates with increased demand and supply of electricity. 
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Chapter 6: Presentation of the Case-Companies 
The companies I interviewed are, as mentioned earlier, of different sizes and have different 
types of ownership. In this chapter, I will therefore give a short description of the case-
companies, in which I will include details that I consider relevant for the subsequent analysis.  
I have based the company presentations below on information given during the interviews, as 
well as information available at the companies’ websites, including “about us” documents and 
financial reports.  
6.1 BKK 
The municipality of Bergen and eleven other nearby municipalities formed what was going to 
be Western Norway’s largest power company, BKK, in 1920. Since then, the ownership 
structure has changed some, with Statkraft AS, subsidiary of the government-owned Statkraft 
SF, now owning 49.90% of the stocks in BKK. The municipality of Bergen owns 37.75%, and 
various municipalities hold the remaining 12.35%. BKK has about 1 100 employees, and had 
in 2012 a net income of kr. 835 million, making it the largest company I interviewed for my 
thesis, both in number of employees and financially.  
BKK owns and operates 32 hydropower plants with an estimated annual average generation 
of 6.7 TWh, which also include the partially owned Sima hydropower plant. The sizes of 
BKK’s hydropower plants vary a great deal, from Stend power plant, with an installed effect 
of .9 MW, to the Evanger power plant, with an installed effect of 330 MW. Further, the plants 
differ in type, with most of them categorized as reservoir-based hydropower plants. However, 
most of the plants are located in the same areas, and base their water input on the same 
regulated watercourses and lakes. BKK operates with six “main” watercourses, in which 23 
of the plants are located, with the remaining nine plants located elsewhere.  
The respondent from BKK, Erik Skorve, is the Division Manager of BKK Produksjon, a 
subsidiary of BKK, and Skorve holds a Civil Engineering degree from the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology (NTNU). My interview with Skorve was conducted 
through e-mail, and is therefore not as extensive as some of my other interviews, but I received 
relevant information that I found very useful in my analysis.  
6.2 Småkraft 
In 2002, Statkraft, Agder Energi, BKK Produksjon, and Skagerak Kraft formed Småkraft, a 
company with a focus on developing small hydros on a national scale. Småkraft is through its 
parent companies both government- and municipality-owned, and its headquarters is in 
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Bergen, Norway. Småkraft receives applications from landowners who wish to develop a 
hydropower plants on their land, reviews these, and determines whether the projects are 
economically viable. Thus far, 270 projects have started with a landowner agreement, of which 
Småkraft has discarded many due to findings of red-listed species and other issues. A total of 
35 projects are licensed, but are currently located in areas with restrictions on the power grid, 
and by the fall of 2013, Småkraft owns and operates 35 hydropower plants, where most of the 
plants have an installed effect of around 5.45 MW or less. Småkraft’s power plants account 
for a total annual average generation of about 400 GWh (.4 TWh). Småkraft’s goal is to reach 
an annual average generation of 1.5 TWh. The company employs about 30 people.  
All of Småkraft’s hydropower plants are watercourse-based, so they are used to less 
interference in nature than other companies with varying types of hydropower plants, and its 
focus is on increasing the efficiency in such plants through the equipment.  
The Head of Project Development, Arnulf Røkke, was the respondent from Småkraft, and he 
is educated at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). I met with Røkke in Småkraft’s 
offices in Bergen, of which he also gave me a quick tour.  
6.3 HelgelandsKraft 
Established in 1995, HelgelandsKraft (HK) is a municipality-owned power company based in 
Mosjøen, Norway. The largest shareholders are the municipalities of Rana and Vefsn, with 
26.85% and 18.28%, respectively. In 2012, HK reported a net income of kr. 55 million, and 
they currently have about 300 employees.  
Today, HK owns and operates ten wholly owned hydropower plants, in addition to Kolsvik 
power plant, in which HK owns 50% of the shares, with Nord-Trøndelag Elektrisitetsverk 
(NTE) as the other shareholder. The sizes of HK’s power plants vary, from an installed effect 
of 2.0 MW to 55.0 MW, and the category of the plants varies as well, depending on the size 
of the plants, with the small hydros being watercourse-based and the larger ones being based 
on reservoirs and regulated watercourses. The annual average electricity generation for HK’s 
power plants is approximately 1.0 TWh, of which HK’s share of Kolsvik power plant accounts 
for 252 GWh. In total, three of HK’s ten power plants account for close to 80% of their total 
generation.  
HK usually confines its developments to the Helgeland area in Mid-Norway, and is currently 
developing the Øvre Forsland power plant, which they affectionately refer to as “the most 
beautiful hydropower plant in Norway”. The plant will have an installed effect of just below 
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10 MW, and an annual average effect of about 30 GWh. In the fall of 2013, HK has eleven 
projects under planning or construction. 
The respondent from HelgelandsKraft was Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, who has worked as Project 
Developer at HK for two years, and graduated in 2008 from NTNU with a Civil Engineering 
degree, with focus on hydropower. I conducted the interview with Bjørnå-Hårvik though a 
video conference. 
6.4 Tafjord Kraftproduksjon  
Tafjord Kraft established its subsidiary Tafjord Kraftproduksjon in 1997, to manage the 
company’s power generation and transferring. Based in Ålesund, Norway, Tafjord 
Kraftproduksjon is through its parent company owned by the municipality of Ålesund and 
BKK. For simplicity’s sake, from here on I shall refer to Tafjord Kraftproduksjon as Tafjord.  
Tafjord wholly owns and operates eleven hydropower plants. Furthermore, the company owns 
34% of the shares in Svelgen Kraft Holding AS, which owns two hydropower plants and rents 
an additional two. The largest of Tafjord’s power plants, Tafjord 1 to 5, are located in the 
Tafjord Mountains, and are reservoir-based, while the company’s smaller plants are 
watercourse-based. In total, the annual average generation of Tafjord’s plants is about 1.1 
TWh, and their installed effects varies from 2.0 MW to 132 MW. Tafjord is also working on 
a few acquisitions, which the company have not yet announced. Tafjord’s Dyrkorn power 
plant, opened in 2011, was the first plant in Norway with an installed Coanda intake. Both the 
supplier and Tafjord market this intake as gentler on the environment, and more efficient, 
especially during the fall and winter. I will discuss this intake further in my analysis. 
The respondent from Tafjord, Per-Kåre Skudal has worked close to 30 years in the Tafjord 
Corporation, and holds the position as Project Developer at Tafjord Kraftproduksjon. He has 
an educational background in electrical engineering with an additional focus on energy and 
hydropower law. During the interview, Skudal gave me a tour of the Dyrkorn power plant, 
which was very enlightening.  
 
 
 64 
Chapter 7: Analysis 
In this chapter, I will present the information I have collected through my interviews. The 
chapter will focus on the findings according to the topics of this thesis, and I intend to compare 
the findings of each case to the secondary data I have presented earlier in my thesis, where 
applicable. As the interviews involved four respondents from different companies, the cases 
would naturally differ in focus based on the respondent’s interests, and I intend to illustrate 
the differences as a part of my analysis. I have structured this chapter somewhat similar to my 
thesis, to ensure that the information runs in an intuitive, chronological flow. 
7.1 Hydropower Development So far 
Some of the information I got when introducing the subject of past developments was quite 
similar, which I expected when talking about events in retrospect. However, the respondents 
listed various reasons concerning the development, which I found very interesting, and it is by 
looking at these I kick off my analysis. 
All of the respondents noted the date January 1 1991 as a turning point in modern hydropower 
history. On this date, the Norwegian Parliament adopted the Energy Act and liberalized the 
power market, and based on the interviews, this shall be the starting point of my analysis.  
7.1.1 The 1990s 
“The most important – triggering – factor of the entire [power] market is 
the Energy Act, and when it came in 1991, it turned the market upside 
down.”  
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
The power market based on monopolies in electricity generation and supply was deregulated, 
and the companies controlling the power grids now had to allow for open access. Røkke 
continues, 
“The fact that the landowner now had the opportunity to develop because 
the [power grid] companies were required to accept electricity was the legal 
change that opened up for the [small hydropower] market.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
After the liberalization of the power market, Thue (2006) notes that the development stalled, 
which the respondents confirmed.  
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“From an almost complete stop in hydropower development after the 
introduction of the Energy Act […], the development has rebounded since 
2000.”  
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
The respondent from HelgelandsKraft (HK) concurred, saying: 
“… And it [the hydropower market] was dead for approximately 10 to 15 
years, until the mid-2000s, when small hydropower started to take off.” 
- Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
Bjørnå-Hårvik adds that it was in the mid-2000s that HK saw the possibilities of small hydros, 
and began reviewing the most attractive small hydro projects. However, the company held a 
critical and selective position, which is why their small hydro portfolio today is somewhat 
limited, but quite good, according to Bjørnå-Hårvik.  
The statements of the respondents fit well into the secondary data and information I have 
collected, see Chapters 2.2.12 and 2.3.1, which tell us the same story of a decade of relatively 
calm hydropower development, for small as well as larger hydros. So how does the 
respondents explain the stagnation in the hydropower development?  
“… The low real prices of energy – especially electricity – in Norway during 
the 1990s prevented the small hydro development from starting.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
I last spoke about the electricity prices in context to the Energy Act in Chapter 2.2.12, in which 
Thue (2006) accredits the public’s disinterest in the act to the low electricity prices. As we 
know, hydropower plants back then were solely depending on the income from generated and 
sold electricity, and low electricity prices result in reduced income, which reduces the 
willingness to invest, leaving the entire hydropower industry rather undesirable.  
7.1.2 The 2000s 
However, as the new millennium approached, the global spotlight turned to renewable energy:  
“… Around 2000, there was talk of incentives for new renewable energy in 
the EU area and one began to imagine a market for el-certificates in Norway 
too.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
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Further, the electricity prices seemed to increase somewhat permanently in the 2000s, as seen 
in Graph 6, and Skudal had the following comments to parts of this price development: 
“Something happened in 2005. We got CO2 quotas that suddenly added 15 
– 17 øre to the electricity price. […]. The price level of 2005 did something 
to the willingness to invest in small hydros. […] the landowner awakened, 
as did the investment companies.” 
Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
Skudal adds that during the summer of 2005, Tafjord and other power companies sold large 
amounts of floodwater for 25 øre/kWh, a price they could only have dreamed about a decade 
earlier. He adds that increased license application queue at NVE in the period 2007 to 2010 
reflects the small hydro popularity. Bjørnå-Hårvik refers to the increased demand after small 
hydropower in and subsequent of 2005 as a boom, and explains that HK has the past few years 
worked on expanding their hydropower portfolio, focusing on GWh, not necessarily on the 
goodness of the projects. Regarding this denoted boom, Røkke is under the same impression: 
“I would say the optimism was at its highest from 2005 until the financial 
crisis of 2008” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
The early optimism showed in Småkraft’s 2002 goals, in which the company aspired to 
develop a portfolio consisting of 2.5 TWh worth of annual generation within a ten-year period. 
However, Småkraft failed to recognize three important issues facing small hydropower 
development that forced the company to adjust their goals. First, NVE’s license application 
process was longer than expected, second, the costs of building and operating small hydros 
were higher than initially estimated, and third, the limit on the power grid prevented 
development in certain areas. I will get back to some of these factors later in the analysis. 
Røkke brings up the global recession that hit in 2008 and suggests that this did indeed affect 
the hydropower industry as well, which is the same impression Bjørnå-Hårvik is under.    
7.1.3 Electricity Prices 
Skudal accredited the mid-2000s small hydropower boom to the generally high electricity 
prices of 2005, making small hydropower a lucrative investment. In Chapter 5.1.1, I 
investigated the development of the electricity prices, and found several noteworthy moments. 
Skudal had the following to say about the recent price path: 
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“We had a cold winter in the fall of 2009, the spring of 2010, as well as in 
2011. The spring of 2011 was very cold, with almost empty reservoirs and 
soaring [electricity] prices.” 
- Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
This information fits well with Graph 6, represented by the last two peaks in the graph. As for 
the price movement after these periods, Skudal connected this to the price of oil and coal, 
saying: 
“But then, we had a year of high precipitation in 2011, which filled the 
reservoirs. […] the price of oil declined, and the price of coal declined, and 
these are references for the power prices. […]. So, it is clear that we see a 
much lower power price in 2012, and 2013, and onwards, compared to the 
price from 2005 to 2011.” 
- Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
Skudal’s thoughts concerning the electricity price development confirm the connection 
between oil and coal and the electricity price previously mentioned by Holstad and Pettersen 
(2011). The statement above also fits Graph 6, represented by the lack of spikes in the fall of 
2011 and 2012. Skudal adds that the falling electricity prices clearly affects the small 
hydropower development, and in some cases, power companies may even have to devaluate 
existing small hydros. 
7.2 Developing a Small Hydro Plant 
According to the respondents, the hydropower development industry consists of power 
companies and hydropower consultants. While the power companies either hold the rights to 
a watercourse or team up with a landowner in the early stages of a project, the hydropower 
consultants usually work with landowners who want to establish their own, privately owned 
hydropower plants. In the interviews that the topic of hydropower consultants came up, the 
respondents were mostly negative, suggesting that because the consultants have very little ties 
to the finished private hydropower plant, the focus on for example new equipment and 
methods is often overshadowed by the focus on “getting things done”. However, as I have not 
had the chance to interview a hydropower consultant, I only have one side of this discussion, 
which is why I feel that it would not be right to focus too much on this subject.  
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7.2.1 Current Development Philosophy 
What I found during the interviews was that the companies do in fact prioritize differently. 
That said, certain stages and aspects of the development, like the standardization of equipment 
and methods, were quite similar.  
“Basically we are looking for the best quality possible, at the lowest possible 
cost, naturally. In certain areas standardization and buying in bulk 
contribute to this and in other areas and projects the opposite applies, with 
customization and the ability to take bold choices.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
Røkke brings up the power station building as an example of a component that is fairly 
standardized. Småkraft operates with a standard building, designed in stone and glass by 
architect Paal Karhs, with some local variations. By doing so, Småkraft can save costs, while 
at the same time present an appealing front. Further, Småkraft is determined never to settle 
with traditional methods, and runs a continuous search for new methods and solutions. Bjørnå-
Hårvik tells me that HK tries to standardize as much as possible, to avoid having to special 
order a large amount of components. However, HK believes it is also important to be creative, 
and search for methods to save costs, and the company is always open to smart solutions.  
According to Skudal, Tafjord has focused on environmental solutions in their small hydros the 
past few years, with a special focus on the impact of drilling the tunnel for the conduit, and 
the intake. Skorve expresses that BKK is committed to the idea of maximum resource 
utilization, and thus focuses on increasing the efficiency in their plants.  
When it comes to the separation between developing new hydropower plants and investing in 
existing plants, the respondents also shared similar views. Skorve notes that for BKK, 
“Both alternatives can be evaluated.”  
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
By investing in existing hydropower plants, my respondents separate between upgrades of 
their companies’ own plants, and acquiring new power plants, notably from private citizens 
who invested in their own plant. According to Røkke, the life as a private hydropower owner 
is often not easy and lucrative as initially believed, especially because of the patience required. 
Småkraft gets many inquiries concerning sales of small hydros, and are currently in the last 
phases of two acquisitions. 
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“While we speak a substantial amount of GWh is for sale in the market, 
through existing projects.”  
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
I will elaborate more on the renovation projects when I reach the topic of el-certificates. 
7.2.2 Investment 
In Chapter 4, I explained the general structure of an investment in small hydro. As the key 
estimates in such an investment relies on macroeconomic factors such as electricity prices, 
global recessions, and governmental incentives, the investment analyses of different power 
companies will often be very much alike. As developers use the same, or very similar, 
equipment in their small hydros, the need for reinvestment is also present. From my interviews, 
I learned that the companies estimate about the same lifespan for a small hydro, at about 30 to 
40 years, with necessary reinvestments every 10 to 20 years. The lifespan represents the period 
of which the power company measure the costs against the expected revenue. There is 
naturally a difference between the financial lifespan and the actual lifespan, and a company’s 
views on this difference determines, to a degree, what equipment it uses in development. 
According to Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK operates with a theoretical infinite ownership and lifespan 
of a hydropower plant, and he says that, 
“There is probably a difference between the companies that have operated 
hydropower plants for decades, and those new in the industry who may have 
to think differently to stay in business.” 
- Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
Which suggests that there are different “routes” a company or private citizen can take when 
developing a small hydro. This can relate to the choice of equipment and other structural parts 
of the planning and development.  
An important factor when considering a new hydropower project is the profitability of the 
project, and developers try as best they can to estimate the future revenues and costs. However, 
when it comes to the return on investment for a small hydro, Skudal had the following to say: 
“A large power company with a desired rate of return at 7.0% to cover loans 
and installments, as well as to secure some profits, must usually be patient 
during the first operating years.” 
- Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
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In connection to the calculated net present value of a hydropower project, Bjørnå-Hårvik notes 
that 
“It may take many decades before [the project] is on the ‘right side’ relative 
to the net present value.” 
- Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
7.2.3 New Solutions and Methods 
“[…] the hydropower industry is, however, based on modern technology” 
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
In this part, I will present some of the new solutions that my respondents have informed me 
about during the interviews. I have found that the length of which each of the companies I 
interviewed go to in implementing new technology and methods is directly linked to their 
development philosophy. BKK, for example, focuses on R&D connected to maximizing the 
resource utilization in their plants, which involves research on improving the Pelton turbine, 
intake hydraulics, and the grating. 
“The idea is that there is value in small improvements of the equipment. All 
improvements that result in increased utilization of the water resources will 
be valuable in the future of hydropower” 
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
Further, BKK also focuses on improving the generator availability, to reduce downtime in the 
plants, as well as streamlining the project management for both new projects and upgrading 
projects.  
“I think it is important to grasp that the market actors do not necessarily 
react the same when it comes to innovation, and do not feel the same need 
for innovation.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
Småkraft focuses on reducing costs in certain aspects of the hydropower plants, and uses the 
knowledge and experience gathered from an implemented solution to determine whether to 
use the same solution in other projects. In the Eidsetelva power plant, they used a new 
aluminum-based pool solution to reduce costs, and they intend to use an improved version of 
this in an upcoming small hydro. In addition, in one of its small hydros, Småkraft used a GPS-
controlled method to drill the tunnel for the conduit, not unlike the technology used to drill for 
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oil in the North Sea. This method reduced the costs and resulted in less interference in the 
surrounding nature than usual.  
Most of HK’s hydropower plants are remote controlled from its headquarters in Mosjøen. 
Although Bjørnå-Hårvik considers this practically a standard in today’s hydropower market, 
he believes that further developing this technology will result in less operating costs, as video 
surveillance in various components of the company’s plants would streamline the process for 
the technical responders and potential repairs. Further, in line with HK’s infinite time 
perspective, the company focuses on purchasing components and materials that would serve 
this long-term view, even though this usually means increased investment costs. HK’s Øvre 
Forsland power plant project, scheduled for opening in 2015, focuses on aesthetics and the 
fact that hydropower and nature can go hand in hand. According to Bjørnå-Hårvik, the 
surroundings of the projected plant inspired HK to focus on design in the early phases of the 
planning, and the company has actively publicized the project, through traditional media, as 
well as social media, which has resulted in both national and international interest.   
“There are good reasons to be adept and focused on the environment.” 
- Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
Skudal made Tafjord’s focus on the environment very clear during our interview, in which he 
described the Dyrkorn power plant and its accompanying Coanda intake. Tafjord installed the 
intake, which utilizes the Coanda Effect9, when developing the plant in 2009, after doing 
research on foreign hydropower plants and their equipment. The Norwegian and British 
suppliers, Brødrene Dahl AS and Dulas Ltd., respectively, advertise the intake as 
environmentally friendly due to the technology that allows for fish and smaller organisms to 
pass the intake unharmed, which is not necessarily the case with traditional intakes. After three 
years of operation, Skudal states that the project has indeed been a success. In addition to being 
gentle on the surrounding nature, the intake also increases the efficiency, as it requires less 
maintenance and downtime during the cold winters, and Skudal estimates that the Dyrkorn 
power plant generates 98.7% of its theoretical maximum, which, according to him, is very 
efficient. Tafjord is also looking at ways to manufacture the Coanda intake on a different 
                                                 
9 The Coanda Effect, named after Romanian aerodynamics pioneer Henri Coandă, says that a stream of water will follow a 
surface, even as the surface curves.  
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location, and have it transported by helicopter to the hydropower plant site, thus reducing the 
need for superfluous roads.  
“In retrospect, we felt extremely innovative, […] we adopted a new 
technology and we built Northern Europe’s first Coanda intake.” 
- Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
7.3 NVE and the License Application Process 
In Chapter 2.4, I described the application process that either new hydropower plants, or 
certain restorations in existing power plants, must go through to earn the right to utilize water 
resources. Ahead of my interviews, NVE was one of the topics I was most curious about, as 
this appears to be a sore subject, especially in the media. To gain further knowledge about this 
subject for my analysis, I contacted Asle Selfors, Senior Consultant in the Licensing 
Department of NVE, via e-mail, who was very helpful and clarifying.  
“Large hydros, small hydros, and wind power are all desirable projects that 
contribute to the Norwegian goal of permanently increased renewable 
electricity generation […]. We therefore want and accept all cases.” 
- Asle Selfors, NVE 
When asked about NVE’s routines connected to socioeconomically viable projects and 
projects that best serve the common good, whether NVE prefers, or prioritizes, such project, 
Selfors states 
“Both small and large hydro projects can be socioeconomically viable […]. 
NVE does not discriminate with regards to size.” 
- Asle Selfors, NVE 
Selfors implies that NVE processes the incoming license applications according to standard 
routines and the number of available caseworkers. NVE does not appear to choose 
socioeconomically viable projects, which are often larger hydros, over other projects. 
Nevertheless, as Selfors also mentions, there are currently no waiting line for larger hydros 
(10 MW and over), while there is a long waiting period for small hydros, and Selfors explains:  
“This is because the processing time per MW license-given is significantly 
longer for small hydros than large hydros, and therefore larger hydros are 
somewhat prioritized when allocating internal resources.” 
- Asle Selfors, NVE 
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Thus, there seems to be some prioritization when it comes to large hydropower development. 
Selfors adds that in the recent years, NVE has received about 10 to 20 applications annually 
concerning larger hydro projects, and NVE has approved most of these, though perhaps with 
some limitations connected to minimum flow requirements, for example.  
When discussing the general license application process, Røkke has the following to say: 
“NVE collects all views connected to a project, and determines if the project 
is controversial or not. […] NVE makes a decision based on an overall 
perception of whether the total positive consequences outweighs the 
negative ones […].” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
When a developer delivers a license application for a hydropower project, the project goes 
through several stages within NVE until they make a decision. “Controversy”, is as mentioned 
a key term, and the caseworkers at NVE focus on determining the extent of this term, in 
addition to the physical attributes of a projected plant. Røkke continues, 
“There are large differences between what NVE considers damning reasons 
in a project, and these vary from visibility of waterfalls, findings of red-
listed species, or loss of scenery, etc.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
Røkke estimates that NVE approves about 60% of the license applications today, while back 
in 2004, he suggests that NVE approved almost all. Graph 3 supports this theory, with 2004 
being the year when the number of applications increased rapidly, thus moving away and 
increasing the difference between number of total and approved applications. According to 
Selfors, today NVE actually approves closer to 70 to 80% of the applications, and they get 
from 100 to 150 applications each year. NVE has about 600 cases waiting to be processed, 
and thus hydropower developers must expect to wait a while for NVE to process their 
applications. When asked about his thoughts on the quality of the applications today, Selfors 
answers:  
“What limits the number of applications is in many cases profitability; many 
of the best projects are already built or protected.” 
- Asle Selfors, NVE 
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While in the previous chronologically based application process the developer somewhat 
knew long he had to wait, the new geographically based process is much less predictable. The 
respondents in my thesis were all positive to this new method, which NVE introduced to speed 
up the process and thereby allow more projects to enter the el-certificates market.  
“[…] an application submitted in 2006 – those still exist – and one 
submitted right before Christmas [2012], were both at the same stage of the 
NVE process in February. This happened to us (referring to the newest 
application).” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
As the quote above indicates, NVE’s new processing method is quite unpredictable, and this 
is something that developers must consider when planning a hydropower plant. Bjørnå-Hårvik 
and HK are also positive to changes made to increase efficiency at NVE, though they have yet 
to experience it first-hand. By organizing the applications according to geography, NVE is 
able to prioritize areas that for example have available power grid access, and this is something 
that the power companies, the ones I interviewed included, are aware of, so they can adjust 
accordingly. Thus, a developer can ensure some prioritization in the NVE application line by 
doing research on the relevant areas and the local power grid. Bjørnå-Hårvik had the following 
to say about the process, which I believe represents the general opinion in all four of my 
interviews: 
“It takes a long time. Perhaps too long, as it may take up to ten years from 
initializing a project until the license is approved and one is ready to 
develop.” 
- Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
There is no arguing that the application process is time-consuming. However, Skudal notes 
that NVE used to process only 30 to 40 applications a year, so of course it is going to be 
difficult to manage three, four and five times as many every single year. Skudal continues by 
stating that he believes there are many bad projects currently waiting in line at NVE – projects 
based on an unrealistically high electricity price or el-certificates value. Many of these projects 
may pass NVE’s initial investment analyses only for the caseworkers or developer to discard 
the application at a later point, thus wasting time. Skorve gives NVE credit for being thorough 
and meticulous, and adds that NVE must follow certain acts and regulations that demand extra 
time. However – he adds – the long process is absolutely a challenge for BKK. 
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In Norwegian politics, there have been discussions about how they can reduce the waiting 
lines at NVE, and the new government has included a passage about on this topic in their 
Political Platform. This part explains that the government aspires to move the legislative power 
over licenses from NVE to the municipalities. This was not included in the government’s 
revised national budget for 2014, but they may include it later. Skudal, and Robert Rønstad 
who was also present during the Tafjord interview, commented on this, saying that such a 
solution would be costly for the municipalities, as well as somewhat time consuming, as the 
municipalities have to hire people with hydropower expertise who may then need a certain 
training period.  
Bjørnå-Hårvik suggests that a change in NVE’s appeal procedures could reduce the total 
processing time. It is Bjørnå-Hårvik’s impression that this part of the process is unnecessarily 
long and time consuming, as the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy usually reviews the appeal 
case very similarly to how NVE reviewed the original case, except with new caseworkers. 
Bjørnå-Hårvik suggests that a change in the appeal procedures, like a more detailed and critical 
review of the complaints at NVE before sending the case to the Ministry, can reduce the 
processing time for each individual application, thus the total processing time.  
During my interviews, the respondents were surprisingly positive towards NVE and its 
routines, even though they are time-consuming and often criticized in the media. It appears 
that the companies have settled with the idea that the process takes time, and that there is very 
little to do about this as the process is subjected to Norwegian acts and regulations.  
7.4 Environmental Aspects and Conflicts 
Although my focus in this thesis is on small hydros, which are often watercourse-based and 
therefore requires less regulation, thus less interference in nature, some of the companies I 
interviewed own larger hydros, so I chose to include this topic in my interview guide. What I 
have gathered from my interviews is that the locals and the environmentalists are usually quite 
skeptic during the planning phase of a hydropower project.  
“[Hydro] power development triggers associations to submerged 
landscapes, reservoirs, and large technical measures […]” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
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Røkke goes on explaining that this does not necessarily apply to Småkraft, being a developer 
of small hydros. He continues, 
“I believe that in advance there is some skepticism, but then the locals see, 
[…], that the projects are less dramatic than what one usually connects to 
[hydro] power development.”  
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
In fact, he adds, when the power plant opens, the architecture and structure of the plant seem 
to impress the locals, and this is often the focus in the local media coverage. Skudal seems to 
be under the same impression as Røkke, with some negative attention during the development, 
but in the end generally satisfied landowners and locals. Concerning environmentalists, Røkke 
adds 
“Paradoxically, from the environmental movement there are many who 
deem small hydros undesirable, but this is often ideologically grounded.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
By this, Røkke refers to the environmental views that small hydros are destructive in nature, 
as he has not experienced that certain plants lead to significantly more protests than others do.  
The respondents from BKK and HK did on the other hand have more experience with 
conflicts, concerning both locals and environmentalists. Skorve says that BKK usually meets 
a certain level of conflict in connection to its hydropower projects, especially those involving 
regulating and changing watercourses, which does not always sit well with neither locals nor 
environmentalists. By wanting to change a watercourse, BKK’s project often compete with 
landowners and their own plans for the watercourse, thus sparking a conflict. According to 
Bjørnå-Hårvik, it is HK’s impression that emotions and different perceptions play important 
roles in the conflict, and being located in the Helgeland area, the company must consider 
reindeer husbandry and grazing areas, as a power plant may affect these. Therefore, HK tries 
to keep an open dialogue with landowners and the possibly affected farmers, while NVE 
decides whether the project is too interfering in the nature.  
All of the respondents seem to be very committed to an open and bilateral relationship with 
possible landowners, which they consider important both for the initial development of a 
hydropower plant, and for the future operation of the plant. The general perception of 
landowners is that they are enthusiastic and engaged, and they do rarely take a passive or 
indifferent stand during the development.  
 77 
When it comes to the impact of small hydros on water organisms, Skudal is not very impressed 
with the industry. When he investigates the Coanda intake by contacting foreign developers 
and owners, he realized that other hydropower countries seem to focus much more on the 
hydropower plants’ impacts on the environment and ecosystem. When asked what he believes 
are the reasons this appears to have a low priority in Norwegian hydropower, he suggested 
that 
“[…] perhaps we have too many watercourses – and we have gotten a bit 
spoiled.” 
- Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
He also adds that for example South Africa has stricter rules than Norway when it comes to 
minimum flow requirements. Such rules and regulations are subject to change, and minimum 
flow requirements is one of the measures NVE can impose during its revision of a plant’s 
license terms, as mentioned in Chapter 2.4.1. Skudal estimates that today, hydropower plants 
accounting for about 3.6 TWh of annual electricity generation do not have minimum flow 
requirements. In addition, he explains that Tafjord works closely with the local Tourist 
Association to ensure that possible interferences are not too large and interfering with hiking 
or tourism.  
Skudal believes that environmental issues have become more important in today’s hydropower 
industry. He states, for example, that the focus of the caseworkers at NVE has somewhat 
shifted, from an economic and technical point of view to an environmental one. Skudal 
estimates that in certain areas, NVE denies about 50% of the application based on 
environmental reasons, which is not necessarily bad, according to Skudal, who also has 
positive things to say also about the Environmental Protection Agency and their work. 
Although often used as a scapegoat in the media, Skudal estimates that the agency is actually 
positive to at least half of the proposed hydropower projects.  
Regarding the governmental resource rent tax used to capture rents from hydropower plants 
with an installed effect larger than 5.5 MW, Skudal believes the government should, and will, 
increase this level to include all small hydros, i.e. to 10 MW, which they have discussed, but 
not yet implemented. Opponents of the low resource rent tax base, like Skudal, argue that it 
prevents optimal utilization of a watercourse, as it could be expensive for developers to get an 
additional tax of 30% on their production if the installed effect were to slightly surpass the 5.5 
MW limit (Lie, 2012b).  
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7.5 El-Certificates 
While the cases showed certain similarities when it comes to hydropower development, the 
opinions and thoughts of the respondents concerning the el-certificates system seemed to differ 
more.  
The Norwegian government introduced the joint Swedish-Norwegian el-certificate system on 
January 1 2012, as mentioned previous in my thesis. However, other countries, Sweden 
included, had introduced el-certificates almost a decade earlier, and because of this, the 
Norwegian hydropower industry had waited a long time such a system. As mentioned in 
Chapter 7.1.2, the much-anticipated el-certificates were part of the optimism that drove the 
small hydro development in the beginning of the 2000s, which resulted in the inception of 
Småkraft in 2002, according to Røkke. Alas, it would take a long time for the extra income to 
benefit the owners of Norwegian hydropower plants. 
“[…] so [the el-certificates] will increase the possibilities for development, 
without a doubt. […] and it will be easier to make investment decisions.” 
- Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
The respondents all agreed that the el-certificates system encourages hydropower 
development, in new projects as well as restoration projects, as they provide an extra revenue 
that can increase the net present value in the investment calculations. In Chapter 5.2, I 
described how the el-certificates system works, and how the value of these certificates has 
developed. As we saw, the value, i.e. spot price, of the certificates has moved up and down 
quite a bit the past few years, forcing some power companies to use a conservative estimate 
of 15 øre/kWh, when it was 25 to 30 øre/kWh10, a couple of years ago under the Swedish 
system. Of course, with such volatile values, the el-certificates pose a certain risk for the 
hydropower industry, if developers decide to include this extra income in their investment 
analyses. Bjørnå-Hårvik stated that 
“I believe that in today’s market, […] [the el-certificates] have been 
necessary for realizing a lot of projects.” 
- Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
                                                 
10 Measured in NOK, not SEK as in Chapter 5.2. 
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When it comes to upgrading existing power plants, the same principles apply, except that NVE 
only issues el-certificates for the extra electricity added because of the upgrade, and Skorve 
says that 
“[…] so the costs of upgrading existing hydropower plants are not directly 
outweighed by the el-certificates.” 
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
That said, Skorve adds that the el-certificates system has made it interesting to review the 
hydropower project portfolio once more. Røkke is a bit more positive to these kinds of 
investments: 
 “Non-profitable rehabilitation projects can quickly turn profitable because 
you get 15 years of el-certificates in addition to the revenues.”  
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
However, it is important to mention the dates set for the el-certificates system. The 
construction of the plant must have started after September 7 2009, and construction must be 
finished before December 31 2020. If a power plant does not meet these criteria, it is not 
eligible for el-certificates. Although the hydropower industry both hoped and expected the 
Norwegian government would introduce the el-certificates for many years, the actual 
implementation, and the start and end dates, came quite unexpected on some of my 
respondents. According to Røkke, Småkraft started development of a power plant a mere week 
before September 7 2009, and so this was ineligible for el-certificates. The debate concerning 
the retroactive effect of the el-certificate system has long been on the political agenda, with 
some political parties – the Conservative Party included – pledging to move the starting date 
further back. Skudal refers to the start-date as 
“The so-called ‘great injustice’ towards small hydros built between January 
2004 and September 2009 […]” 
 - Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
and he believes the current government will push the start-date back eventually, as he finds it 
difficult to imagine that the government can get easily away from these promises. Røkke doubt 
this will actually happen, and adds that this is his personal opinion and this does not necessarily 
reflect Småkraft’s thoughts.  
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The final date for entering the el-certificates market in 2020 is also the cause of dispute. My 
respondents are all fully aware of the limited time left to secure el-certificates. If the power 
company has not completed the hydropower plant, or the renovations necessary to add a 
permanent increase in electricity generation, by December 31 2020, the plant will not be 
eligible for el-certificates. With only nine years left, the respondents know that the moment 
has passed for some projects. As I mentioned in Chapter 2.4.2, NVE pledged to review all 
license applications handed in before January 1 2013 by 2017, so that the approved projects 
could make the el-certificates deadline.  
“The general perception is that the projects that can make the el-certificates 
system by 2020 already have licenses. Thus, it is less likely that the projects 
in line at NVE will be completed before 2020.” 
Erik Skorve, BKK 
This perception creates new obstacles and risks for the hydropower industry. As my 
respondents have informed me, many projects are dependent on the extra income from the el-
certificates, and without this income, the companies may not have developed certain plants.  
“Towards the end the risk of not being included in the system increases.” 
Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
However, Skudal suspects that the deadline could possibly change, saying: 
“I do believe that the 2020 deadline will be changed with the new 
government, […] to stick to that date [December 31 2020] would be a 
catastrophe.” 
- Per-Kåre Skudal, Tafjord 
Skudal bases this statement on, among other things, the pressure on components suppliers 
towards 2020. As I conducted the interview with Skudal on October 23 2013, the results of 
the election were fresh, and in an e-mail sent on December 3 2012, Skudal informs me that 
the government will leave the final date unchanged for now, but the Swedish and Norwegian 
governments may change it during the first checkpoint in 2015.   
With this in mind, I will in the next part focus on the period from now until December 31 
2020, and the last part of this chapter will cover the respondents’ expectations for the 
hydropower market after 2020.  
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7.5.1 Before 2020 
In the previous part of this chapter, I have presented some of the opinions and thoughts of my 
respondents regarding the el-certificates system. The system is closing, and the power 
companies are aware of this. Nevertheless, what will happen to the hydropower as the system 
closes? 
First, as there are only nine years left, the companies I have interviewed are all under the same 
impression that new hydropower plants that have yet been approved by NVE will have 
difficulties reaching the 2020 deadline. Røkke comments on this, saying 
“The [hydropower] market is beginning to fill up because it is about to be 
too late for the el-certificates.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
This realization has forced the hydropower developers to consider other options to gain the 
extra income, which include restoration projects. According to Skudal, the turbine in older 
hydropower plants often generates around 87% of its potential, and by replacing the turbine 
one is able to increase the efficiency to 92% or more, and be eligible for el-certificates. Power 
companies are working on such restoration all over the country, and Tafjord currently has two 
restoration projects applications waiting in line at NVE. Another option to increase the 
efficiency of a power plant – and thus receive el-certificates – includes regulating a 
watercourse to ensure a higher water input in the power plant, thus increasing the amount of 
generated electricity. Skudal continues with explaining that for Tafjord to start developing 
new hydropower plants at this moment, this must be through collaborations with landowners 
that already have project approved, or close to approval, by NVE, or else there is not enough 
time. BKK started in 2013 renovating the Matre Haugsdal power plant, which will lead to a 
substantial increase in generated electricity, and this renovation project entails an additional 
income from el-certificates once it is finished.  
Bjørnå-Hårvik expresses that HK’s focus right now is to realize their projects before 2020. If 
a project is unlikely to make the deadline, the future of the projects is very uncertain, and HK 
may never realize the project. 
Towards the end of the 2010s, the respondents expect a rush of hydropower plans hoping to 
secure the 15 years of income from the el-certificates.  
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“The small hydropower market will be pressured, and there will be a race 
to get one’s project realized.” 
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
“There must occur a substantial activity boom in the coming years if the el-
certificates system is going to work as intended.”   
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
Røkke adds that for the Swedish-Norwegian el-certificates system to reach the goal of 26.4 
TWh of new renewable energy, the bottlenecks effects must be mitigated, and he mentions 
Statnett’s current billion NOK investments in the power grid as part of a solution to these 
problems. I previously mentioned Skudal’s worries concerning the suppliers, and their ability 
to deliver the components and materials necessary for the coming “Klondike Rush”, as he 
denotes it. Skudal estimates 600 to 700 new hydropower plants until 2020, which is close to 
100 per year, which he believes is cause for concern, in terms of materials supply. Røkke 
agrees with this, saying: 
“We expect there to be a struggle over scarce resources such as excavators, 
blasting capacity, access to equipment, and so on.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
Skudal also raises concerns about the quality of the equipment if such a struggle was to occur, 
fearing that hydropower developers in desperate need of reaching the 2020 deadline may turn 
to equipment of lesser quality to circumvent the struggle and possible delays. In addition to 
possible shortage of equipment, Røkke suggests that the explosive increase in new hydropower 
plants may negatively affect the prices. 
“The prices in the spot market show signs of a downward trend, and many 
point out that the reason is the expectation of this new power that affects the 
supply side.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
Røkke raises a relevant point in terms of general market economics, which would suggest that 
an increase in supply, such as the expected increase in new hydropower plants until 2020, 
would effectively decrease the price, unless the demand rises with an equivalent amount in the 
same period.  
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7.5.2 After 2020 
When the el-certificates system closes on December 31 2020, NVE and Statnett will have 
distributed the last of the certificates, which will still generate an income until 2035 for the 
power plants opened in 2020. By this time, the goal of the Swedish-Norwegian system is to 
have increased renewable energy-based electricity generation by 26.4 TWh, preferably 
through a 13.2 TWh increase in both countries. The Norwegian government controls the value 
of the el-certificates through the Electric Certificates Act, as explained in Chapter 5.2.2. 
Because of this, there is a lot of uncertainty involved, according to my respondents. 
“There is also a risk connected to the expected prices [value] when the 
system closes.” 
- Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
Bjørnå-Hårvik adds that power companies are depending on political decisions and demand 
after el-certificates to maintain the income that they may have used in their project’s initial 
investment analysis. Therefore, it is important to decide whether to include this income in the 
calculations. HK does include the el-certificates income, but the company is well aware of the 
risks of doing so, as the value could suddenly drop in the near future. Røkke explains the 
uncertainty connected to the el-certificates in the following way:  
“There is a great uncertainty as to what happens after 2020, because the el-
certificates market is first and foremost a way to encourage investment 
decisions, […] and the best course of action for all, except the power 
companies, may be that the [el-certificates] market is rather impoverished 
afterwards.” 
- Arnulf Røkke, Småkraft 
As I mentioned in Chapter 4, in most cases, Skudal estimates the investment calculations both 
with and without the el-certificates income. However, Tafjord’s newest project, Via power 
plant, currently under development, would not have been built without the el-certificates. The 
plant is located in a remote area with no road connection, and the investment cost was about 
5.0 to 5.5 kr/kWh, which Skudal considers high, but Tafjord wanted to utilize the watercourse, 
and a conservative estimate of future el-certificates revenue allowed for this.  
While Skudal suggested the government might postpone the 2020 deadline for the el-
certificates system, as a way to cope with the inevitable rush close to the deadline, Skorve does 
not believe this would happen. 
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“We do not believe the el-certificate system will be extended [beyond 2020], 
nor do we believe the government will introduce other incentives.” 
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
The two other respondents seemed to be under the same impression as Skorve, that the end-
date is absolute. All four of my respondents are operating with December 31 2020 as the final 
date, and my impression from the interviews is that their focus today is how to best utilize the 
el-certificates system. The more uncertain period after 2020 appears to be mostly based on 
estimations, speculations, and a healthy dose of wishful thinking.   
7.6 The Future of Norwegian Hydropower 
From the previous subchapter, it is clear that the el-certificates system currently plays an 
important part in the present and future of the hydropower industry. My respondents raised 
concerns about the future value of these el-certificates when the system closes in 2020, as they 
are fully dependent on political willingness and decisions. Skorve states that 
“If the goal of the el-certificates system [26.4 TWh] is reached, there will 
be more than enough power in the system, and an extension of subsidies will 
be further destructive for the market.” 
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
We can connect what Skorve implies to Røkke’s thoughts on the future electricity prices, and 
how these may decrease if the supply side of the electricity market increase substantially. The 
Swedish and Norwegian governments have conducted thorough calculations considering the 
future supply and demand of electricity that form the basis of the el-certificates system and 
the goal of 26.4 TWh of new electricity generation is the result of these calculations. It is 
therefore reasonable to believe that this, for the time being, is the optimal amount of supply 
for the market in 2020 and onwards.  
“If there are no motivations to increase the share of renewable energy after 
2020, and we have a situation with surplus production, then the hydropower 
development will stop after 2020.” 
- Tore Bjørnå-Hårvik, HK 
If the motivation, and the accompanying incentives, was to stop in 2020, Bjørnå-Hårvik 
believes that HK will shift its focus towards streamlining and rationalizing the operation and 
maintenance sections, and away from new developments. Skudal and Tafjord are under the 
same impression, by underlining the importance of the el-certificates’ value and possible other 
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incentives financed through the consumers’ electricity bill for the future hydropower 
development. Skudal mentions that hydropower plants do have other possible revenue 
streams, among these the guarantee of origin program. This involves environmentally 
conscious consumers in for example England or other European countries who pay more to 
ensure that the electricity they consume is based on a renewable energy source. However, as 
Skudal points out, this is a niche market, thus it is limited and does not account for much in 
the grand scheme of things. He also adds that he believes that the development of wind power, 
also eligible for el-certificates, will decrease significantly in Norway because of the high 
investments costs, impact on the surroundings, and wind-dependent production, connected to 
this form of renewable energy, especially in comparison to hydropower. 
Skudal mentions that he expects foreign investors will play a larger role in the future of 
development. He continues by stating that there is nothing in the governmental acts and 
regulations that prohibits a foreign investor in a small hydro – though this is different for large 
hydros – and when private small hydros owners grow old, their heirs may not want to continue 
the somewhat tedious work, and will probably be looking to sell. The hydropower plant is 
lawfully connected to the land, so it may also be financially difficult for one heir to buy out 
other siblings. This is when Norwegian investors, power companies, or foreign investors 
appear.  
Most of my respondents painted a rather grim picture of the future of hydropower development 
– a future based on uncertainty, calculated guesses, and dependency on politicians. However, 
the respondent from BKK seems to be less worried, stating, 
“Hydropower will continue to be the most important source of electricity in 
Norway in the future, and investments in good hydropower projects will be 
made also after 2020.” 
- Erik Skorve, BKK 
Selfors expects new projects in the future, once again pointing out the profitability of projects. 
“Onwards, we believe there will be new projects in all categories, most 
within small hydropower and wind power. It is largely a developer’s 
assessment of a project’s profitability that decides the applications we get.” 
- Asle Selfors, NVE 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
This chapter focuses on the results from the analysis, and I will include empirical data 
presented earlier in this thesis to compare against the collective findings of the analysis. 
8.1 The Development of Hydropower Thus Far  
A very clear common denominator from my interviews was the fact that the Energy Act 
changed everything about the Norwegian power market. The respondents consider January 1 
1991 the “birth” of the small hydropower industry. Even so, the findings reveal, as the 
secondary data suggested, that the 1990s was a decade of very little activity in the hydropower 
industry. One respondent attributes this to the low price of electricity in the period, which 
corresponds to a theory mentioned by Thue (2006). This argument fits the idea that owners of 
hydropower plants base their income on the electricity price alone, if there are no additional 
financial incentives.  
Towards the middle of the 2000s, the development of small hydropower started increasing, 
and from the mid-2000s, it shot through the roof, as explained by the respondents and 
supported by the secondary data. Several of the respondents believe this happened due to 
increased electricity prices, as well as rumors of future governmental incentives, mainly an el-
certificates system. The increase in electricity prices is by the respondents explained by 
increased precipitation and temperature, CO2 fees, and increased oil and coal prices. These 
explanations do also fit well with the empirical data mentioned in previous chapters. 
According to the respondents, the high electricity prices ignited the small hydropower 
development that the Energy Act had facilitated 15 years or so earlier.  
One respondent brought up the topic of the resource rent tax during the interview, stating that 
this is likely to change with the new government, to include all small hydros. As we saw in 
Chapter 2.1.2, the government, owners of hydropower plants, and environmentalists all have 
different perspectives and agendas when it comes to this tax, and it is certainly a heated topic. 
One can argue that the tax discourages plants with an installed effect above 5.5 MW, even 
when this is economically advantageous, thus creating a barrier in the small hydropower 
development. 
8.2 Developing a Small Hydro Plant 
The companies in my case study have very different perspectives and missions when it comes 
to hydropower development. While some focus on environmental solutions, others aim at 
aesthetically pleasing or efficient plants. With such a wide range of focus, there appears to be 
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little in common between the companies. This is either somewhat unusual or completely 
normal, depending on the following: As I have mentioned, some of the companies are 
connected through parent companies, with varying ownership shares, which could naturally 
lead to biased information. Although none of my respondents mentioned their company’s 
owners, it is reasonable to believe that the parent company has some influence in the day-to-
day operation of its subsidiaries. If we theorize that there is no particular influence present, 
and the companies manage their own goals and operation, the different motives and focus are 
rather unusual for an industry we can consider somewhat limited. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to assume that the parent companies wishes to be present in each part of the 
hydropower market by diversifying their subsidiaries’ expertise and knowledge, thus creating 
the differences. However, my impression from the interviews is that the companies act quite 
independently. 
As the companies’ motives and goals differed, so did their perception of innovation and new 
ideas. While some respondents consider their company very innovative, others focus on 
improving and perfecting their current methods and instruments, which of course involve 
certain innovative skills as well. As mentioned in the analysis, the respondents’ views on new 
equipment and methods coincides quite well with my initial perception of the companies and 
their philosophy, with the environmentally conscious company focusing on eco-friendly 
solutions, the efficiency-targeting company focusing on streamlining their processes, and so 
on.  
When it comes to the planning, structuring, and developing of a small hydro, the respondents’ 
replies showed certain similarities. In Chapter 4, I described a general investment in a mini 
hydro, and explained the risks a developer must consider in the investment calculations. The 
respondents seemed to agree on the general characteristics surrounding such an investment, 
although there are naturally differences in the costs and types of equipment the companies 
invest in, based on their policies and philosophy. There are also some differences in what to 
base the future revenue on, and while some included an estimate of the future el-certificates 
value, others calculated both with and without, and in certain cases, this depends on the project. 
I will get back to the value of the el-certificates and the corresponding risk later in this chapter. 
The respondents were all positive to additional investments in existing plants – their own or 
through acquisitions – to increase efficiency and revenue, and they consider this very relevant 
in order to receive additional el-certificates at this point.  
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8.3 NVE and the Application Process 
The views of the respondents concerning NVE were generally positive, though they all stated 
that the license application process is a time-consuming procedure that has affected both their 
previous and current developments. The respondents appear to be very familiar with NVE’s 
demands for both new hydropower projects, as well as restoration projects, which ensures a 
somewhat efficient and meticulous planning process to gather knowledge about what is 
necessary to get one’s license application approved. The respondents were also positive to 
NVE changing its routine to a geography-based one to accommodate for a quicker process, 
even though it makes the processing time more unpredictable from a developer’s point of 
view. That said, the respondents’ knowledge and expertise in the planning process could help 
mitigate the unpredictability of the situation. It is my impression from the interviews that the 
respondents think NVE is a fair and professional institution, with just views on the different 
forms and sizes of renewable energy sources. There appears to be some de facto prioritization, 
based on the amount of processing needed for different-sized projects, but in general, NVE 
initially consider all project applications equal.  
Some suggestions for reducing NVE’s processing came up during my interviews, in addition 
to the government’s plan to decentralize NVE’s license authority to municipalities. The 
general perception of the respondents is that NVE follows the rules and regulations set by the 
government through various acts concerning watercourses and natural resources, and so it is 
difficult to make substantial changes in the license process. This realization appears to have 
greatly influenced the respondents, who now seem to focus on the quality of the license 
application rather than complain and argue about the waiting period. The respondents 
commenting on the government’s plan to move the process over to municipalities were quite 
skeptic, fearing this may lead to an expensive transition period with reduced efficiency in the 
midst of the hectic decade until 2020.  
8.4 Environmental Aspects and Conflicts 
Through the interviews, I learned that most hydropower-developing companies meets some 
resistance at one point or another. Protests and conflicts arise due to emotions connected to 
certain areas or rural industries, and it is often hard to reason against protesters with personal 
agendas. However, the respondents put a lot of effort into pleasing the affected communities, 
and staying in close contact with the landowners to prevent as much conflict as possible. Of 
course, in some cases, the company’s interests coincide with for example a landowner’s 
interests, and if so, it is up to NVE to make a decision based on the relevant arguments, as it 
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is in most cases concerning hydropower projects. The responders gave the impression that 
protests usually arise in the early stages of the development, only to subside at a later point 
when realizing that the project perhaps does not involve as much interference as initially 
believed. Of course, the level of conflict correlates with the size of the projected plant. Earlier 
in my thesis, I described the controversy surrounding the construction of the Alta River 
hydropower plant in the late 1960s, which led to nationwide protests and civil disobedience. 
Today, protective governmental acts, as well as limited large-scale possibilities, have reduced 
the possible impacts of hydropower plants and as the respondents point out, small – and to a 
certain degree “smaller” large – hydros have far less impacts on the surrounding nature. 
One of the respondents also points out that NVE seems to focus more on environmental 
impacts lately, which could possibly lead to developers devoting more time to studies 
concerning the impact on the surrounding nature in future projects, in line with the discussion 
in Chapter 8.3. Further, a respondent comments on the importance of environmental impacts 
in the Norwegian hydropower industry today, implying that this is taken much more seriously 
in other countries, and accredits this environmental indifference to Norway’s vast water 
resources. With the increasing importance of the subjects of nature and biodiversity, it is 
reasonable to assume that this is something that will influence the future hydropower 
development, though it is of course difficult to say to what extent.  
8.5 El-Certificates and the Future of Hydropower 
The el-certificates system and its corresponding market was, as expected, an important topic 
during my interviews. The respondents all had different opinions and thoughts concerning this 
incentive-based solution, especially in connection to the waiting period at NVE. With the 
expected application processing time, which of course is hard to predict, and the time it takes 
to develop a small hydro, the respondents all agreed that it is at this point too late to submit a 
new project and expect this to be up and running by December 31 2020. However, the 
respondents still consider smaller projects, like improvements and watercourse regulating 
viable options, as these application processes usually do not take as long, nor does the 
subsequent construction. Of course, there are some constraints, most notably the fact that the 
developer only gets el-certificates for the additional electricity generated, not for the total 
generation. This makes accurate calculations and preliminary studies two very important parts 
of the profitability analysis of a restoration project.  
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Because the government is the legislative body of the el-certificates, the respondents base their 
thoughts and opinions connected to the future of the system on election promises, theoretical 
estimations, and industry rumors. The respondents all acknowledge that the future of the el-
certificates and their value is uncertain, and while some consider the possibilities of the 
government extending the el-certificates system, others believe that the system functions best 
if allowed to run its planned course. Concerning extending the el-certificates system, the most 
tangible solution is to shift the entrance date back further; making hydropower plants built 
some years before September 7 2009 eligible for el-certificates. The current government has 
mentioned this earlier, but so far, there have been no indications that this will change, which 
of course makes some of the respondents question whether this change will ever happen. The 
respondents expect a significant increase in new hydropower plants until 2020, a “Klondike 
Rush” as one so eloquently puts it, and this rush raises the two following concerns in the 
respondents. First, with an increased amount of new hydropower plants follows and increased 
demand in materials and labor. If suppliers are not able to meet this demand, the respondents 
fear that projects can be delayed, thus not making the el-certificates system deadline, or forced 
to resort to inferior equipment. Hydropower developers relies upon the good graces of both 
the media, environmentalists, and politicians, thus a step back, environmentally or otherwise, 
could damage its reputation, and compromise the future developments. The second issue 
concerns the increased supply of electricity that comes with the new hydropower plants, and 
how this affects the electricity price. According to market theory, unless the demand for 
electricity increases accordingly, an increase in supply will lower the prices, thus reducing the 
hydropower plant’s revenue. As we saw in Chapter 5.3, the electricity consumption in Norway 
from 1993 to 2013 shows very little signs of increase, and if this trend would continue, a large 
increase within the next ten years seems unlikely. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
Norwegian government has calculated the quota obligation for the el-certificates system using 
an annual growth in electricity consumption of .3%, meaning they are aware of the potential 
change in price, and perhaps are incorporating other factors, like increased electricity exports, 
to restore the equilibrium.  
The future after 2020 is very unpredictable, as the respondents do not know how the el-
certificates value will develop. If the government sees it fit to reduce the quota obligation 
imposed on electricity suppliers (see Chapter 5.2.2), the demand for el-certificates will 
decrease, thus decreasing their value and the power companies’ revenues. The respondents do 
therefore have very different opinions considering the future of the hydropower industry, most 
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likely based on personal outlook and their company’s motives and business plan. Some of the 
respondents expected a rather dramatic decrease in hydropower development, on par with the 
effects of the Energy Act in 1991, as the possible revenues would be too low for many 
hydropower projects, reducing the investments willingness of power companies and investors. 
Others were more uncertain, arguing that good projects will still be profitable enough to attract 
investors. One of the responders brought up the subjects of foreign investors, once a heated 
topic in Norwegian hydropower, as we saw in Chapter 2.2.3. Despite the foreign investors 
being part of the reasons for the Norwegian acts concerning licensing, watercourses, and water 
regulation, there are currently no rules against foreign investors in small hydros with limited 
watercourse regulations. Further, the respondent is under the impression that hydropower 
plants often involves more work and costs than the owner’s heirs are ready for, which could 
result in sales of existing plants, either to other private investors, power companies, or foreign 
investors.  
Based on the respondents’ statements, I believe it is fair to assume that the profitable projects 
left will be the main target of many power companies in the coming decades, as the amount 
of electricity sold eventually becomes the main source of revenue. Nevertheless, these projects 
are, like the total hydropower plant possibilities, limited. In Chapter 1.2, I mentioned that until 
now, power companies and private citizens have utilized about 60% of the available 
hydropower in Norway. In Chapter 2.2.10, I explained the governmental protection plans and 
how the currently protected watercourses accounts for an estimated 23% of the electricity 
generation potential, leaving only 17% untapped. If the Norwegian el-certificates system 
works as intended, new renewable energy-based electricity generation – mainly by hydro and 
wind power – will have increased by 13.2 TWh by 2020. As we have seen, wind power 
currently accounts for a very low percentage of the total electricity generation in Norway, thus 
a feasible theory, which the respondents seem to support, is that new hydropower will be 
responsible for a substantial share of the goal. If so, a large part of the estimated available 36.1 
TWh of hydropower will most likely be developed by 2020, effectively decreasing the 
possibilities for further hydropower development.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
In this thesis, my goal was to investigate the Norwegian hydropower industry, and to locate 
and describe the important factors that play determinant roles in the hydropower development 
with focus on small hydros. I found it necessary to study the historical development as a 
backdrop for my thesis, to serve both as theoretical support for the findings, and as reference 
for comparison. The different perspectives of the respondents provided this thesis with a 
detailed view of the hydropower development from the power companies’ point of view, and 
the respondents seemed eager to explain and discuss the subject of my thesis, and talk about 
the past and future development of the hydropower industry.  
The multiple-case studies gave me valuable information that formed a detailed picture of the 
hydropower development, with each respondent adding their opinions and what they believed 
contributes to, and brakes, the development. In the interviews, some of the topics raised similar 
thoughts and opinions, while other pieces of information were solely the product of the 
respondents’ own perceptions of the development. When comparing the different statements 
from the cases, one thing that struck me was the different views on how the el-certificates 
system, and its duration, affects the hydropower development. These different perspectives 
lead me to question the sustainability of the Norwegian hydropower development, as the 
responses to whether the government should continue with an incentive-based solution 
differed so much. One can argue that an industry depending on incentives for progress is not 
very sustainable at all, which may be the case for Norwegian hydropower, when interpreting 
the different perspectives. 
Further, as with most natural resources, the number of watercourses is finite, and at one point, 
there will be only protected watercourses left. Thus, the future of hydropower development 
may very well shift from new hydropower projects to renovations of existing hydropower 
projects to accommodate for the decreasing market potential that developers are likely to see 
in in the 2020s. In addition, some also consider the increase in electricity supply because of 
the increased amount of new hydropower plants troubling, and fear the consequences this may 
have on the electricity prices.  
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My findings connect the Norwegian price of electricity to the global prices of oil and coal, as 
studied by Holstad and Pettersen (2011). With the global impact on the prices of oil and coal, 
one can tie a link between the global economy, electricity prices, and Norwegian hydropower 
development. The findings seem to indicate such a pattern, especially concerning the global 
recession of 2008, with the drop in number of license applications and new hydropower plants 
from 2007 to 2011, although whether we can accredit this drop to the recession alone is hard 
to determine with the current information. However, it is worth mentioning that the spot prices 
of electricity have been very volatile in this period, which increase investment uncertainties, 
and as the Nord Pool Spot market trade electricity in EUR/MWh, fluctuations in the 
NOK/EUR exchange rate will influence a hydropower plant’s revenue. 
In addition, the el-certificates have played an enormous part in the development. Despite the 
driver the certificates have been the past few years, the respondents recognized the uncertainty 
of the system, and the risk this uncertainty entails concerning future revenue. However, if you 
are fully aware of the risk, it is possible to use conservative estimates for the future value in a 
project. The focus on renewable energy shifts across political parties in Norway, which makes 
it difficult to estimate how the government of, let us say 2025, will view the system, and if 
they might feel the need to reduce the quota obligation because of other political motives.  
Many of the issues facing small hydropower developers connect to the government. Arguably, 
the most influential bottleneck a hydropower plant developer faces is the license application 
process at the Norwegian Water and Energy Directorate (NVE). Due to the strict rules and 
regulations imposed by the government through the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, NVE’s 
processes are time-consuming and usually last years. Hydropower developers are painfully 
aware of this, and even though the directorate has proven to be a difficult obstacle to overcome 
the past few years, the respondents express that there are rarely any quick solutions and fixes 
to deal with issues in governmental bureaucracy. Connected to the long NVE application 
process is the issue with power grid access. In certain areas, the possibilities of hydropower 
development are simply non-existing because they do not have the power grid access needed 
to transport the electricity, effectively “blacklisting” these areas.  
The current resource rent tax on small hydropower plants also seem to inhibit the hydropower 
development. Enforced at the 5.5 MW level, it splits the small hydros with regards to taxes, 
and results in developers building hydropower plants with less installed effect than what they 
consider optimal. Until the event that the government might change this, the resource rent tax 
represents a bottleneck for optimal utilization of watercourses. 
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In addition to the three aforementioned bottlenecks, I believe there are two important potential 
issues the hydropower may meet in the near future, the first being access to materials and 
contractors in the coming years. With the closing of the el-certificates system in 2020, there 
will be a rush of projects, small and large, to make the deadline, and the responders worry the 
possible shortage of important components or labor may lead to projects not making the 
deadline, thus posing a threat to some project developments.  
The globally increasing focus on the environment and biodiversity may also turn into a future 
bottleneck for hydropower development. NVE is focusing on the quality of watercourses 
affected by hydropower plants in its license terms revisions and the focus on biodiversity may 
increase, as one respondent indicates. If so, NVE’s demands are likely to increase, leading to 
hydropower developers spending more time on time-consuming preparatory environmental 
assessments, to get their license applications approved. 
Further Research 
This thesis includes a limited number of respondents, thus it could be relevant to include a 
larger spectrum of research units, like private hydropower owners, environmentalists, 
politicians, and so on. This way, a researcher can be able to create a complete picture of the 
hydropower industry, social aspects and all, and determine whether there are more issues 
facing the future of the industry. It could also be interesting to study the effects of the closing 
of the el-certificates system, to see if this does in fact reduce the developments significantly, 
perhaps by studying other countries that have similar experiences, and determine how well the 
incentive-based solution has actually worked.  
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Appendix A 
Illustration 1. Google Trends 
 
 
Illustration 2. Brødrene Dahl’s graph for selecting a turbine, with intake (Q) and height (H) 
as determinants: 
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Appendix B 
Table A. The relative changes in small, large, and total hydro, 1974 – 2012: 
Year Rel. Δ Small Hydro Rel. Δ Large Hydro Rel. Δ Total Hydro 
1974 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,52 % 
1975 -0,56 % 2,27 % 0,52 % 
1976 0,00 % 0,44 % 0,17 % 
1977 -0,56 % 3,54 % 1,03 % 
1978 -1,70 % 2,99 % 0,17 % 
1979 0,58 % 3,32 % 1,70 % 
1980 -0,86 % 2,41 % 0,50 % 
1981 -0,29 % 3,14 % 1,16 % 
1982 -0,87 % 3,04 % 0,82 % 
1983 -3,22 % 2,95 % -0,49 % 
1984 0,60 % 0,72 % 0,66 % 
1985 1,80 % 1,78 % 1,79 % 
1986 -0,88 % 1,40 % 0,16 % 
1987 0,30 % 1,03 % 0,64 % 
1988 0,00 % 1,37 % 0,63 % 
1989 0,30 % 2,69 % 1,42 % 
1990 0,30 % 0,66 % 0,47 % 
1991 -1,18 % 0,00 % -0,62 % 
1992 0,30 % 0,00 % 0,16 % 
1993 -5,36 % 0,00 % -2,80 % 
1994 -0,63 % 0,98 % 0,16 % 
1995 0,63 % -0,97 % -0,16 % 
1996 -1,89 % 0,00 % -0,96 % 
1997 -3,21 % 1,63 % -0,81 % 
1998 0,66 % 0,64 % 0,65 % 
1999 1,32 % 0,64 % 0,97 % 
2000 -0,65 % 1,58 % 0,48 % 
2001 2,94 % -0,93 % 0,96 % 
2002 -0,32 % 0,31 % 0,00 % 
2003 1,27 % -0,31 % 0,47 % 
2004 1,89 % 0,00 % 0,94 % 
2005 1,85 % 0,94 % 1,40 % 
2006 2,12 % 1,56 % 1,84 % 
2007 4,15 % -0,31 % 1,96 % 
2008 3,70 % 0,62 % 2,22 % 
2009 13,46 % -0,31 % 6,95 % 
2010 7,02 % -0,61 % 3,65 % 
2011 26,02 % 0,62 % 15,27 % 
2012 8,26 % 0,00 % 5,21 % 
Source: SSB (2013b). Small Hydro ≤ 10 MW, Large Hydro > 10 MW 
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Appendix C 
 
Interview Guide – Power Companies 
1. Questions Connected to the Respondent: 
- What is your position in the Company, and for how long have you held this position? 
2. Questions Connected to the Company and Hydropower: 
- How many hydropower stations does the Company own/operate? 
- Does the Company currently work on any hydropower projects? 
- How has the demand for hydropower developed the past ten years in the eyes of the 
Company? 
- Is the hydropower development affected by macroeconomic and/or political events? 
- Does the demand after hydropower follow the general macroeconomic cycles? 
- When building new hydropower plants, does the Company follow a standardized 
development plan, or schematic, or do you customize each plant? 
- To what degree does the Company focus on new instruments and methods, i.e. is the 
willingness to invest present when considering entirely new inventions? 
3. Questions Connected to the Company and Their Customers: 
- Does the Company normally take on new hydropower projects, or is investing in 
existing plants an option? 
- What are the factors that play a role when purchasing equipment for a new plant? 
- Does the Company experience that landowners have their own prioritizations or 
wishes when contacting the Company? 
- Has the Company experienced that landowners wish to focus on the environment, or 
esthetics, when developing a hydropower plant on their property? 
- Is the Company in charge of the operating of the plant, or does this vary from 
landowner to landowner? 
- Has the Company experienced any conflict with the landowner concerning the 
questions mentioned above? 
4. Questions Connected to the Company and the Locals 
- How much does the Company usually intervene in the nature, c.f. reservoirs, etc.?  
- Does the Company experience conflicts with the locals when planning and developin
g a hydropower plant, and if so, does the conflict persist? 
- How would you describe the attitude towards hydropower in Norway today?              
Compared to wind power. 
5. General Questions Concerning Hydropower Development: 
- Is it possible to say anything about the general investment- and operating costs for a    
small hydro?  
- Fjellkraft AS say on their home page “… it may take a long time before the                  
investment pays off”, is the Company under the same impression? If so, how long are 
we talking? 
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- How long is a small hydro expected to generate electricity, and is this the lifespan       
used in investment analyses?  
6. El-Certificates 
- Background: “Until 2020, Sweden and Norway will expand the electricity generation 
based on renewable resources by 26.4 TWh”.  
- Has the el-certificates system made investing in hydropower more attractive? 
- Has the el-certificates made investments in existing plants more economically viable? 
- What is the Company’s views on a system like this? 
7. License Applications 
- What is the Company’s attitude towards NVE and its license applications process? 
- NVE changed their routines recently to process all applications from one geographica
l area at the same time to speed up the process, has the Company been affected by thi
s? 
- Do you have any suggestions as to what could further reduce the waiting line? 
8. The Future of Hydropower and Political Influence 
- How does the Company view the future of hydropower in Norway? 
- How will the el-certificates system affect this future, and what does the Company       
expect will happen before and after 2020? 
- Now that there has been a change in the Norwegian government, does the Company    
expect any changes in hydropower development, based on the new governing parties’    
politics or pledges? C.f. Competition, profitability, investments, and research. 
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Appendix D 
 
Figure 1. Elspot Prices and Brent Blend spot price: 
 
Figure 1. Source: Nord Pool Spot (2012b) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Electricity Generation and Consumption: 
 
Figure 2. Source: SSB (2013e) 
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